Reviewed
by Ahmet An
Mr
George Vassiliou, who served as the President of the Republic of Cyprus between
1988 and 1993, wrote in this book about his experience as the Greek Cypriot
negotiator in the intercommunal talks with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr Rauf
Denktash. Mr Denktash, who passed away on 13 January 2012, had lived to
negotiate with 5 Presidents of the Republic of Cyprus (Makarios, Kyprianou,
Vassiliou, Clerides and Papadopoulos) and 4 Secretary-Generals of the United
Nations (Kurt Waldheim, Perez De Cuellar, Boutros-Gali and Kofi Annan). Mr
Vassiliou predicts: “Turkish governments, which are fragile in their
composition, really are not in a position to control Denktash... The present
status quo in Cyprus is likely to endure at least until there is a change in
the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and quite probably into the next century.”
(p.145)
But
the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots was taken over by Mr Mehmet Ali Talat in
April 2005 and by Dervish Eroglu in April 2010 and nothing changed in essence,
because as Mr Vassiliou described: “What they wanted, essentially, was the
creation of two independent states, as well as the continuation and
legalisation of the states quo.” (p.28) One should bear in mind that the
Turkish policy on Cyprus was designed in the 1950’s together with the
Anglo-Americans.
It
is interesting to read that Mr Vassiliou stressed to Mr Bush’s Minister of
National Defence, Mr Dervinsky: “While the USA insisted emphatically on the
withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afganistan, Cambodia and Angola, they
have not done so in the case of Cyprus. If this happen it will mark the
beginning of the end. Let us all join efforts so that this becomes a reality.”
(p.102)
Mr
Vassiliou writes: “I did my best, I was polite, good natured, relaxed and cool,
but Mr Denktash becomes every time more and more intransigent.” (p.101) Mr
Denktash used to joke with him by saying that Mr Vassiliou had the skill of
selling refrigerator even to the eskimos!
Although
President Vasiliou was a businessman,
not coming from the traditional politics of Cyprus, he worked successfully with
his political realism against the ‘patriotic’ demagogy of the rejectionists at
home by defeating the policy of ‘preconditions’ (the insistence on the need for
the Turkish Army to leave Cyprus and for Greek-Cypriot refugees to be allowed
back to their homes in the north of the island before any talks could start)
put by his predecessor, Mr Spyros Kyprianou. (p.7) He was able to meet President Bush of the USA
four times, while his predecessors had met only once the President of the
Republic of Cyprus during their term in office. (p.164)
On
the other hand, Mr Vassiliou worked hard during his term in office and managed
with his team to secure the most important UN Security Council Resolution 789
that had ever been issued on Cyprus (p.241). The UN Secretary-General stressed
also in his report: “In essence Mr Denktash wishes the creation of two
‘ethnically cleansed’ statelets which will in some way cooperate with one
another.” (p.240) After a number of talks, Mr Vassiliou secured another
resolution by the European Parliament in Strassbourg which adopted the
positions of the Security Council and called upon the Turkish side to join the
talks in March 1993. It also asked for the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation
troops from Cyprus and urged Turkey to accept the confidence-building measures
included in Resolution 789.” (p.251)
But
unfortunately, when Mr Vassiliou lost the presidential elections by a few
hundred votes to Mr Clerides, “the opportunity and the momentum towards a
solution for the reunification of Cyprus evaporated.” (p.258) “Mr Clerides
abandoned the commitment to a solution after negotiations on the basis of the
Gali Ideas and thus gave Denktash the opportunity to extricate himself from the
procedure without suffering any damage.” (p.256)
Mr
Vassiliou had the opposition of some of the Greek Cypriot political parties at
the home-front against his handling of the Cyprus problem. They were
essentially opposed to the compromises contained in the high-level agreements.
(p.128) The head of the Cypriot Church, Archbishop Chrysostomos, added his
voice to the well-known positions of Messrs Kyprianou, Papadopoulos and
Lyssarides. (p.129)
The
author writes: “Every time that an idea or a plan was suggested by the UN they
portrayed this as a national disaster, even when, through the various studies
that we submitted to the National Council, it was made clear that the UN plans
did satisfy positions that we were promoting based on the unanimous proposals
of the National Council on which we were committed to negotiate. They kept
repeating they wanted a functional solution without ever disclosing its
contents... This panic of the rejectionists, generated by the probability of
obtaining a federal solution, was not due, in my opinion, to the fact that they
were dreaming of something better. I believe that in essence they had accepted
the theory of the former Greek Ambassador in Cyprus, Mr Michalis Dountas, that
the maintenance of the status quo was in the interests of Cyprus and Greece and
not of Turkey... This status quo, namely the de facto partition, they later
called the ‘second best solution... As they kept insisting and as the later
president Papadopoulos repeated to a rally of the youth section of DHKO in
Thessaloniki on 28 February 1992, an agreement would make the Turks sovereign
in the North and partners in the South.” (p.259)
I
endorse what Mr Vassilou says to this: “Unfortunately, of course, it is
precisely that is happening. It is thanks to the non-existence of an agreement
that the Turks are the absolute, uncontrollable rulers in the North, while with
the passage of time they have every opportunity to become partners in the
South.” (p.259)
In
the last chapter, the author informs us of a conversation which he had with
Tassos Papadopoulos in 2003 when he was asked to help ensure Cyprusʼ
entrance
into the European Union: “(Papadopoulos) simply hoped, without saying so, that
Mr Denktash would always be there to reject any plan. I did not,
however,
hesitate to ask the president to what extent the Annan Plan that he was now
supporting was so much better than the Gali Ideas which he had fanatically
fought against. His reply surprised me and took my breath away at the same
time: ʻWho said anything like this? The Gali Ideas were much better than the
Annan Plan that we have in front of us. And this is better than any future plan
for a solution.ʼ
I
end up by repeating the words of John Kennedy as Mr Vassiliou did: “Compromise
does not mean cowardice... Compromise in other words, requires a vision for the
future.” (p.260)
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