A comment on an article from the dusty press archives

Below you find an article, published in the Greek-Cypriot daily Neos Anthropos and reproduced a few days later, on 19.3.1952 by the Turkish-Cypriot daily Halkin Sesi. The article is written by G.Ioannidis, K.Koliannis and P.Roussou and its title is “Liberation Struggle of the People of Cyprus - The Turkish Minority”. Here are some excerpts:

"The problem of Turkish minority is the main problem in the anti-imperialist struggle. And the AKEL has to put its policy on these problems with seriousness and certainty... It is obvious that the Turkish-Cypriot worker will not believe in the slogan of enosis with Greece...The Turkish-Cypriots do not believe in the Greek-Cypriots and they don’t trust the Akelists. Because they don’t trust the chauvinism of Great Greece... There has to be a single party of the working people. This can be the National Turkish Branch of this single party (AKEL)... Turkish problem in Cyprus is a special national question within the whole National Question. If the AKEL does not have a complete national policy for the Turkish minority, it will not be able to deal both with the enosis cause and the Greek National Cause..."

***

Has the AKEL developed anything concrete in this respect since 1952 when this article was written or since 1974, when the so-called Minorities Department was closed down because of the de-facto partition? Is it because of this vital failure that we experienced the division of the Cypriot Working Class Forces, in 1958 physically and in 1974 geographically? Since our struggle is common, why are we still not in a position to form a united front of the G/C and T/C working masses?

 

(HADE, bi-communal magazine, Nicosia, No.4, September 2001)

 

 

THE ROOTS OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT: IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN DOCUMENTS

Claud Nicolet, who works for the Swiss Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, published the material of his research at the different archives and libraries throughout the United States and at the Public Records Office in the United Kingdom under the title “United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention” in 2001 in Peleus serial of the Bibliopolis in Germany.

Prof. Dr.Heinz Richter wrote in the Preface of the book the following:

“Claud Nicolet heavily relies on a vast amount of archival material-mostly documents, telephone conversation recordings and oral history interviews- most of which has only opened up for research during the past four years and much of which has been declassified at his own request. As a result, he is not only able to shed some light on heretofore mysterious and hardly-known aspects of America’s role in the Cyprus issue, but also manages to plausibly refute some of the often-heard myths about one or the other event in the area.” (p.16)

Since Nicolet informs us in the “Acknowledgements” that “The Swiss Friends of the United States and the Stodola Fonds have kindly decided to support this project”, we cannot expect from him to accuse the organs of the US for the de-facto partition of this island in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although the writer tells us in the “General Conclusions” that “the war of 1974 ended with U.S. tolerance of de facto partition from the mid-1970s onward, simply because it seemed to guarantee better stability in the region than earlier situations” (p.458), he does not accept the theory that the US had endorsed partition since 1956. (p.445)

There are a enough archival material in Nicolet’s book for those eyes who want to see evidence for the US and British strategic interests on the island of Cyprus. Both countries have used the imperial “divide and rule” policy on the island in the past and present. Therefore we can say that the British still want to keep their sovereign “bases in Cyprus”, instead of “Cyprus as a base” (p.87) and the Americans still are eager to secure the use their communication facilities on the island which operate since 1949. (p.141)

THE US INTEREST SINCE THE 1950’S

We can now start to give some evidence of the US interest in Cyprus and how this country destroyed the fate of the Cypriots with the extracts from the material of the book:

Nicolet reports: “In a special research paper circulating in the regional offices of the Department of State in 1952 the Cypriot nationalists were presented as good guys, stepping up their activities for enosis merely in order to “prevent the communists from capturing the initiative in the movement.” (p.43)

Whereas “the British tried to gain the US support by warning the US of the communist menace in Cyprus in 1954 (p.47) On the other hand, the British managed to involve Turkey through her participation at the London Tripartite Conference “in order to be in a stronger position to counter the increasing anti-colonial sentiments” (p.59) on the island. “Turkey repeated British arguments against Cypriot self-government, that it would give the island into the hands of a “Communist infiltrated population.” (p.61)

It was during this period that Dr.Alexander Melamid, American assistant professor of economic and political geography on the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, New York, presented a paper, titled “The geographical distribution of communities in Cyprus” in the “Geographical Review, Vol.46, No.3, New York 1956, p.355-374, after a field work in Cyprus during the summer of 1954.

It was this same Alexander Melamid of New York University, who published in the Journal of Geograpy, March 1960, Vol.59, Chicago, p.118-123, under the title “Partitioned Cyprus: A class exercise in applied political geography” and discussed the principles of two different partition boundaries for the island.

PROPHECY OR PLANNED PROJECT?

Nicolet writes: “The idea of partitioning Cyprus and of including population transfers has gained attraction in certain circles in the United Kingdom and the United States. Surprisingly, one of the first in the West to come up with the proposal was President Eisenhower, the person who in general proved to be so uninformed regarding the Cyprus dispute, in early June (1956). As a spontaneous idea, during a conversation with Dulles, the president wondered whether it would not be possible to put an end to the conflict by partitioning the island, shifting the Turkish Cypriots to the northern part. It was especially the line of partition he had in mind that proved prophetic for the islands’s future fate.” (p.92)

According to the Americans, “the only solution that seemed to have a chance for long-term success was “a middle ground between partition and enosis in the form of a guaranteed independence according to the American plans of April 1957.” (p.132)

Zorlu has told Dulles in Washington that the Turkish idea of partition did not necessarily need to include a geographical division of the island. It may be enough, the Foreign Minister had said, “that the two communities (...) be given the idea that neither was being governed by the other.” This concept sounded surprisingly compatible with the status of independence of the island.” (p.133)

The Republic of Cyprus was the result of such a diplomacy “towards some form of partition of Cyprus, if not geographically, then at least in term of administration.” (p.133)

UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES

Nicolet states that “EOKA’s resort to an armed struggle took the Americans by surprise.” (p.57) But recent publications of a Greek Cypriot author, Makarios Drushiotis, gives us the information that the EOKA had connections with the US secret services. But Nicolet is not in a position to accept a clearer connection of the EOKA-B with the CIA by writing: “In this regard the unproven allegations or suspicions by authors like Stern and Evriviades that the CIA gave financial support to EOKA-B after February 1974 seem illogical.” (p.412)

For the Greek coup in July 1974 in Cyprus Nicolet writes: “There had not been an American conspiracy with the junta.” (p.422) His following evaluation is interesting: “Rather than bad faith, it has been inadequate handling, bureaucratic breakdowns, misjudgements and, finally, some bad luck, therefore, that had been responsible for the US failure. In all this, it must be remembered that President Makarios still bore the primary misjudging the junta’s determination to get rid of him, his game of brinkmanship for once did not succeed, as he needlessly provoked the Colonels. As Kissinger later wrote: “Makarios had undertaken one-high-wire act too many.” (p.423)

The Turkish Ambassador to the US, Feridun Erkin, pointed out “that it is not international custom to decide questions of sovereignty solely on the basis of majority wishes of the population, but that there are also equally important geographical considerations which must be taken into account.” (p.48)

Turkey still supports this idea and she cannot tolerate an independent Republic of Cyprus in her southern borders. This attitude goes back to the year 1956 when “Vice-President Richard Nixon had been deeply impressed by what he called the Turks’ “positively pathological attitude on the Cyprus problem” during a visit to Ankara”. (p.87)

ONE OF THE EARLY US PLANS FOR CYPRUS

Julius C.Holmes, Special Assistant to Secretary Dulles proposed a ten-year autonomy for Cyprus, while the Governor would remain in his position, though having but a few veto-powers. A plebiscite would take place thereafter, guaranteed by NATO. If people voted for enosis they should receive it, but the British should be guaranteed broad military rights regardless of its outcome. NATO’s area would in the meantime be extended to include Cyprus.” (p.86)

THE IDEA OF THREE GUARANTOR POWERS

“Ever since an Indian UN resolution proposed calling for independence has been brought up in early January (1957), the Greek Government has started to lean towards this option. Parallel to the American pressure on Greece to accept a NATO move, the Greeks thus lobbied the Americas for the idea of independence for Cyprus. However, Foreign Minister Averoff made the fatal mistake of disclosing one idea behind independence in a debate in the Greek Parliament on 11 March, when he stated that it would be a transitional stage towards the realization of enosis. The British quickly noted this, while the Americans added concern about the basic idea of independence, because it would result in an economically weak country and would thus offer a fertile ground for communist influence. In order to disperse such fears Averoff has already on 13 February suggested during a meeting with Dulles a treaty of the type applicable to Austria since 1955 with the U.K., Turkey, “and any other NATO nations” guaranteeing that Cyprus would remain independent and not become a part of Greece.” (p.101)

FIRST US PROPOSAL FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

“As early as 16 April (1957, the acting Secretary) Herter (Deptel) wrote to the embassies and consulate of the region concerned that the “US now believes that either independence within (...) or (...) outside (the) Commonwealth coupled in either case with a treaty preventing enosis are worthy (of) serious consideration...The document as a whole was the first ever instance of US support for a specific solution to the Cyprus conflict.” (p.103)

FIRST NSC MEMORANDUM

Nicolet informs us that the first NSC (National Security Council) memorandum for “US policy toward settlement of the Cyprus dispute” was drafted in Washington on 18 July 1957. (p.104)

“The first bilateral discussions between the British and the Americans about the Cyprus problem took place between 10 and 18 September 1957...(The principal American participant, Walworth Barbour emphasized) that the US would not insist on any specific solution, but that the three parameters originally transmitted in a British oral communication of late July would be a useful point of departure. They were: “a) retention of essential military facilities under British sovereignty; b) protection of (the) island from Communist infiltration; and c) establishment (of) peace and tranquility in (the) island as a whole.” (p.108)

SECRET U.S. CONNECTION WITH THE UNDERGROUND ORGANISATIONS

I do not think that it was just a coincidence that the Turkish Cypriot leadership formed its underground organisation TMT during this period parallel to the EOKA of the Greek Cypriots. This organisation started the provocations against the Greek Cypriots and the progressive Turkish Cypriots which prepared the preconditions for an intercommunal feud. Here are some extracts to this effect:

“The CIA Deputy Director, General Charles P. Cabell, reported on the 353rd NSC meeting that Turkish Cypriots started to attack the British for the first time in an effort to force a partition of the island. (Date of the Editorial Note, 30.1.58) (p.115)

“Turkish-Cypriots, in Deputy Governor Sinclair’s words in “their all-out bid for partition,” staged a bomb explosion outside the Turkish Press Office in Nicosia, setting off violent rioting by the Turkish community.” Band s of Turkish Cypriots invaded the Greek Cypriot quarters of the city and attacked its inhabitants, promting Consul Belcher to fear a “virtual Palestinian situation,” meaning a British walkout from the island, letting the two communities fight its future among themselves. The bomb explosion and ensuing riots was to the Greek side a repetition of the tragedy of September 1955, when the Greeks had been attacked in Izmir and Istanbul. Soon enough Greece again blamed the US for not publicly deploring the Turkish Cypriot action America was drawn into the conflict against her will.”(p.119)

It seems that the author, Claud Nicolet does not have information about the main supporters of the Turkish Cypriot terror organisation TMT, as he makes this kind of assessment. (For a Turkish Cypriot evaluation of the role of the TMT in the Cyprus problem, see, Ahmet An’s “Kıbrıs nereye gidiyor? (Quo vadis Cyprus?), İstanbul 2002, p. 121-171)

Again Nicolet alleges that the author Christopher Hitchens shows no documentary evidence to sudden Turkish reversal of its stance after a substantial American loan was given to Ankara in the wake of the Middle East crisis at the time. (p.123) Whereas he writes a few pages later the following: “To this Dulles has no objection, mentioning that the Turks could hardly reject the idea after having received such a generous US aid package in the summer.” (p.128)

Nicolet’s approach to the valuable book “The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion” (1999) is similar when he writes:  “However, the contention by the two British journalists O’Malley and Craig in their sensationalist -and this not surprisingly popular- book, that “Eisenhover forced Harold Macmillan to give up sovereignty but denied the Cypriots real independence” is an inconceivable distortion of facts.” (p.140)

In another assessment, Nicolet says: “Kadritzke’s claim that AKEL had been proscribed because it was the only party that had organized members of both ethnic communities and thus worked against the British-intended ethnic-religious partition seems much too extreme, as it implies British drive towards partition as a set goal and in bad faith, rather than as a consequence of political turmoil and as their perception as the least of various evils.” (Deep-note, p.143)

This is a mere white-washing of the British-American partitionist policies which hides the provocations for the ethnic conflict and anti-communist hysteria of these two countries during the hey-days of the Cold War era. (See Ahmet An’s two article in the same book about the TMT terror on the progressive Turkish Cypriot trade union members who was against the partition policy of the British colonialists and their collaborator Turkish Cypriot leadership.)

As Nicolet mentions the Greek Cypriot contingency plan-Akritas- in his book (p.179), he avoids to mention anything about the Turkish Cypriot contingency plans which was published in full text with the copy of the Turkish original in Glafkos Clerides’s Memoirs “Cyprus: My deposition” (Vol. I, p.203 - 207 and p.466 - 472).

THE PRIORITIES OF THE AUTHOR AND THE US

Although Claud Nicolet supplies us very valuable declassified US and British material on the secret sides of the Cyprus problem, his main aim is written by himself in the following paragraph:

“It was emphasized earlier in this study that the American policy toward Cyprus from spring 1964 onwards never favored the partition of the island. Popular statements to the contrary by many authors of Greek and Greek Cypriot descent, in addition to some British sources, can be disputed with dozens of written documents from the US Department of State. The truth probably lies more in the direction of the following explanation. What was best for American interests, including their communication facilities, was an island that was peaceful and was removed as a bone of contention. Therefore, the US needed to find any solution that would pacify Cyprus. However, the exact outline of this solution and  what exactly it would entail was secondary, and priorities changed over time.” (p.283)

THE CIA OFFICIALS

The author should not forget that the day-to-day politics is done by the Foreign Ministries of the US, Britain, Turkey, Greece, but the secret deep state organisations like the Gladio do not open their archives in order to supply evidence of their subversive policies. Otherwise Nicolet will be writing this:

“Conspiracy theories by those authors who saw the CIA behind almost everything evil that was happening on the island have only been supported by the weak evidence that extremist  circles in Greece had some good relationship with CIA officials. The author Mayes is more careful. He mentions that many Greek and Greek Cypriots believe that the CIA was involved, but there is no proof for this.” (p.397)

Further in his book, Nicolet writes:

“If some CIA officials had actually encouraged the junta to overthrow the archbishop, they must have done so on a personal basis or owing to CIA sympathies with the junta, rather than an official US instructions. (p.450)

What the Cypriots have been suffering in the last 28 years can be found within the lines of Nicolet’s book. We have to congratulate him for bringing these documents into light out of the archives.  But even if he writes that most of the American documents of the 1970’s were not available at the time of his writing of the book” (p.399), he can accuse some authors that they made unrealistic assessments:

“It is therefore probable that Foley, Scobie, Coufoudakis and Polyviou -together with many other authors of Greek or Greek Cypriot origin- in their assessments chose to agree with Makarios that any proposal that deviated from a central Cypriot administration had to be regarded as “partition”. However, such an interpretation merely seemed to be useful for propaganda and justification purposes rather than being a realistic assessment.” (p.401) 

Although Nicolet criticizes the author Van Coufoudakis as a prominent representative of the theory that the US has endorsed partition since 1956 (p.445), he, himself, makes the following assessment:

“By the time Kissinger again came up with a compromise proposal of giving the Turkish Cypriots 30 percent of the island for autonomous rule in different areas, the Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes had already set an ultimatum, with conditions unacceptable to the Greek side.

After two further days of fighting, the Turkish military occupied the approximately 37 percent of Cyprus that it still holds today, according to a plan that had existed since at least 1964, possibly even since the 1950’s.” (p.452)

“Finally, the war of 1974 ended with US tolerance of de facto partition from the mid-1970’s onward, simply because it seemed to guarantee better stability in the region than the earlier situations. Though partition had turned up time and again in proposals throughout the previous twenty years, it had at no time been endorsed as the favourite US solution.

At no time during those twenty years had the Cypriots themselves been at the center of attention in the American formulations of a solution to their dispute. This was obvious when not even the US representatives in Cyprus were consulted regarding more extreme and pragmatic American plans for peace on the island, which triggered whenever the Cyprus conflict escalated.” (p.458)

What is still on the agenda of the US is the plans of the legal adviser Donald A.Wehmeyer, who in his Working paper, dated 11.12.1963 proposed a “Treaty of Joint Sovereignty of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey.” (p.226)

The same US official prepared an “Outline of Possible Cyprus Settlement” which is very interesting in relation to today’s solution proposals:

“On 24 April (1964) Legal Adviser Wehmeyer added an important ingredient for a solution, which would be more attractive to Turkey. Cyprus, Wehmeyer thought, should be divided into provinces. In addition to the plan above, an illusion of partition or federation could be created by designating certain provinces that were predominantly Turkish, as areas where the Turkish Cypriots would have special rights. This would be achieved by designating a Turkish eparch ad perpetuum to these provinces.” (p.229)

Acheson, however, was fully indulging himself in studying the different proposals that had emerged in Washington throughout the spring (of 1964). In Brands’ words, he was ready to devise a plan “that would eliminate the Cyprus problem by eliminating Cyprus.” A suggestion he was particularly intrigued with was Don Wehmeyer’s scheme of 24 April, providing enosis with an illusion of partition or federation to the Turks by the establishment of certain provinces to be administered by the Turkish Cypriot eparchs, as he cabled to Ball on 8 July (p.257).This was reached later through the US policy of   “controlled intervention” (p.213)

The famous American journalist, Cyrus L.Sulzberger wrote an interesting article in his column in the New York Times of 12 August 1961 and pointed to the “danger that the communists might come to power in Cyprus by an honest, democratic election.” (p.166)

Right after we see the approval of a National Security Action Memorandum 98 (25.9.1961) which stated that the  “US should assume a more active role in Cyprus than in the past and desires that the program to this end be pushed vigorously including overt and, where feasible, covert measures to contain and reduce communist strength.” (p.166 - 167)

Who knows what kind of action programs were used after the de facto partition of Cyprus in 1974 to keep the division of the two communities of the island. We can only read between the lines of certain books like “1989 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs” which writes under the “Cyprus” section the following:

“If the north and south of Cyprus were reunited in a future “federated Cyprus” the combined electoral strength of the Greek and Turkish communists could produce a majority of the votes in any presidential election under such a novel government.” (p.530)

(Turkish translation of this article was published in the weekly newspaper Yeni Çağ, on 21, 28 March and 4 April 2003 in Nicosia.)

 

REVIEW OF TWO BOOKS BY KIZILYUREK

 1.      Kızılyürek, Niyazi, Paşalar, Papazlar (Pashas and Priests), Nicosia 1988, 130 pages (in Turkish language)

The first thing to say about this book, written by Niyazi Kızılyürek, is that it does not have a unity of the subjects, dealt in the book. It is rather a compilation of 14 articles on different subjects. Although the title of the book is “Pashas and the Priests”, there is no account of their activities in the book. It seems that the title is selected for the sake of commercial attraction. The book is introduced as the first of a serial, called “Cyprus Notebooks”, as if others will follow. Unfortunately the wish of the writer to bring a new viewpoint to the history of Cyprus is not being realized in the 14 articles, published for the first time in this book. There is no chronological order of the articles, no systematic either. The introduction of the subjects is superficial and they have no connection between them. There are a lot of mistakes about the references of the books and the articles, on which the allegations of the writer are made. Moreover, the bibliography given after the 4th article is very poor for a researcher, who made his graduate and post-graduate studies in Germany. There is no mention of the place and the years of the publications of the reference material. There are also deficiencies in the footnotes within the text. There was also no need to imitate the writing style of the Turkish researcher, Yalçın Küçük. Although it is stated in the inner pages that the typesetting of the book was made in London, there is no mention of where the book was printed (in fact in Nicosia as I heard).

Özker Özgür, the Chairman of the Republican Turkish Party, wrote an article in Yeni Düzen newspaper about this book and said: “The loyalty to the Marxist method of criticism and interrogation is observed in the book. But this did not cause any dryness or boredom.” Thus, we learn from Mr. Özgür that the Marxist method can be dry and boring! Was Mr. Özgür not the one, who found out his reading of Marx’s “Capital” boring and turned to read Bülent Ecevit’s “This order has to be changed”, when he wrote years ago in his column in Halkın Sesi?

Why does Kızılyürek find it necessary to write the following sentence in the preface of the book: “The method of criticism and interrogation of this book serial is Marxist”? We could not find out the answer in the book. After we read the whole 14 articles, it becomes clear, how superficial the researcher understood the Marxist method.

Although in the preface it is written that there are 14 articles in the book, they are not numbered, but put in disorder. The first article is a speech made by Kızılyürek at a panel, organized in London on the “Cypriot Turkish Identity in the Literature”. The writer uses the term of “Cyprus upper-class”, which is not used in Turkish and it is indefinite. It seems that he preferred to use this term, translated from English, after looking at the underdeveloped character of the Turkish Cypriot commercial bourgeosie, instead of defining it with the classical term “bourgeosie”. But it is not appropriate, because it is well-known that the Turkish Cypriot notables have turned from tradesmanship and land-ownership into commercial bourgeosie. Its dependent and underdeveloped structure should not stop the writer to call them with this correct name. Kızılyürek writes the following: “Undoubtedly, there is a collaborationist-traditional section in every colony. But on the opposite side, there are local, national classes, which are pioneers of the national liberation movement, in other words, pioneers of becoming a nation and of modernization. This is failing in the Turkish Cypriot community.”

The writer alleges that he uses the Marxist methodology, but it is a pity that he prefers to take the easy way by saying “No, there isn’t”, when he looks and he does not see what he is looking for. Moreover, this proves that he did not make the necessary research of the socio-economic and political structure of the Turkish Cypriot community, which has a population of 100,000. As he could not use the Marxist thought in a creative way, he writes in short. “The political ideology and the ideological identity of the Turkish Cypriot upper-class formed itself as Sir plus Pasha plus Turan (Panturkism)” (p.20). He refers to the Sirs, OK. But where are the Pashas? He did not see it necessary to refer to the Ottoman society structure, which lasted 300 years and what did it leave as a legacy to the Turkish Cypriot community. He did not deal even with the rebellions of the people against the Pashas and the Priests during the Ottoman period. He writes that the identity of “Sir plus Pasha” got ripe in the 1940’s, without giving convincing and detailed information. Whereas in those years, there were differentiations, which started between the “upper-class” and the “lower-class” of the Turkish Cypriots in the standard of organization and difference of ideological views and the identity of today’s Turkish Cypriot leadership was about to be formed. The internal and external factors towards

becoming a national Turkish community out of a Muslim community started to be influential just at the end of 1940’s.

It seems that Kızılyürek either has insufficient information about the historical formation of the Turkish Cypriot bourgeosie, let alone about the struggle of the Turkish Cypriot working classes or he could not get what he wanted out of English and German reference books he read! Otherwise he would not write the following evaluation: “The reason of this crisis of the Turkish Cypriot community originates from the fact that it does not have a history of his own.” (p.24) If we say it with the writer’s terminology, contrary to his allegation (p.24), both the upper- and the lower-classes of Cyprus have made their own histories. What is important is that, one has not to alienate himself from these histories and has to regard the internal and external factors and that one has to make a scientific historical research. Such a work is done already in the reference books the writer has given.

What are being told in the section titled “Greek Cypriot bourgeosie, which is class-impotent” shows on the contrary, how potent the Greek Cypriot bourgeosie has been. That is why the judgements like are overturned realities: “The Greek Cypriot bourgeois class refrained from making a bourgeois revolution in Cyprus by uniting the Cyprus working class and why it does not want to share the power with the working class.” (p.30-31) Because it was the working class organizations themselves, which caused the historical division of the working class of Cyprus by grasping the enosis ideology of the Greek Cypriot bourgeosie. The explanation of the hegemony of the real pashas of today originates from this historical mistake.

(For the Turkish original article, see Araştırma kitaplarımız bilimsellikten uzak, Kıbrıs Postası, 18-19-21 June 1988)

 

2.      Kızılyürek, Niyazi, Ulus Ötesi Kıbrıs (Cyprus Beyond Nation), Nicosia 1993, 78 pages (in Turkish language), 88 pages in Greek language (İ Kipros peran tu ethnus)

Niyazi Kızılyürek introduced his book “Beyond Nation” to the readers in both Turkish and Greek languages in the same volume with a preface, where he writes: “Since many years, let there be a piece of scientific movement finally. With the hope of having more books published in two languages.” But there have been several scientific publications already about the influences of the Greek and Turkish nationalism on Cyprus problem, written by Greek Cypriots (e.g. Zenon Stavrinides, Michael Attalides and others) and by Turkish Cypriots (Notes on the development of a Cypriot consciousness, a serial by Kemal Cankat, published in the weekly Demokrat newspaper in 1989). Maybe these studies could not reach to a lot of readers, but Mr. Kızılyürek, as a researcher, should have been aware of them.

The author, who seems to be under the influence of Murat Belge, a Turkish writer, and especially of his book “In which part of the world is Turkey?”, tries to adapt Belge’s view, which is “to isolate the existing states from nationalism”. But he makes important mistakes by bringing wrong comments on the history of Cyprus. For example, he writes: “There was never a political or ideological initiative for co-existence” (p.13). He overlooks the activities of the Communist Party of Cyprus between the years 1921 and 1931 and the political activities of the Turkish Cypriot intellectuals, who got together around the weekly newspaper “Cumhuriyet” of the years “1960-1962.

The author defines the founding of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 as a “revolution” and the events of the 1974 as a “counter-revolution”. These examples show us that he is not realist, but he has a schematic approach. He does not refer to the fact that the roots of “competitive nationalism” (in his own words) grasped the Cypriot soil just in this period, when the British colonial administration staged the “1931 rebellion”, in order to stop the common political and ideological activities of both communities. (For a detailed explanation, please look at my serial: “The formation of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, Yeni Çağ weekly, 8 March 1993 – 28 November 1994 – 85 instalments)

How can one create a “Cyprus Beyond Nation” without referring to the importance of the “common class consciousness” in the development of the “us” feeing, without referring to the influence of Greece and Turkey, each being a NATO country, of the influence of Anglo-American imperialism on the Cyprus problem and on the Cypriots themselves?

Kızılyürek writes: “Even in the meetings of the most advanced sections of both communities, one feels the existence of doubt clouds”, which shows from which point of approach he looks at the problem!

We can conclude by saying that Mr. Kızılyürek need to learn more about the science of research and a sense of scientific judgement, before he publishes books, which can cause a lot of unquietness for himself and for those, who wage a struggle for the friendship of the two communities in Cyprus.

(For the original Turkish article, see Yeni Düzen, 30 January 1994)

 

 

  

TWO CYPRIOTS AS THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

MEHMET EMIN PASHA (1813-1871)

          Mehmet Emin Pasha, was a Turkish Cypriot, who was three times Grand Vizier (Prime Minister) of the Ottoman Empire during the sultanates of Abdulmedjit and Abdulaziz:

1^st period     29 May 1854-23 November 1854

2^nd period    18 October 1859-23 December 1859

3^rd period     28 May 1860-6 August 1861

                                               ***    

            He was born in 1813 in the village of Magunda in the Paphos district of Cyprus. His father, Huseyin Efendi, was a Turkish Cypriot, the brother of Ottoman Head of the Exchequer Mehmet Emin Agha. He was a member of one of the families brought to Cyprus from Anatolia for increasing the population after an epidemic of cholera in the beginning of the 18th century.

            After he finished the elementary school in Paphos, he was sent to Istanbul, where his uncle was the Head of Ottoman Exchequer. Through his uncle, he was introduced to Sultan Mahmut and he was able to enter the Enderun at the Ottoman Imperial Court in Istanbul.  He worked as a captain for several years in the Imperial Guard regiments which were established in 1828.

            In 1833 he went to London and later to Paris for higher studies. After Abdulmedjit got into power he returned to Istanbul and served as Major and later as Colonel in the First Army in Istanbul, assigned to guard the Ottoman Palace. Later he was appointed to Tophane.  

            He was the commander of the Akka (Acre) Castle in 1844 and later governor in Jerusalem.  He was appointed on 31 August 1848 as the Ottoman Ambassador in London. He visited Flanders for the crowning of the Flanders’ King.

            He was appointed as the governor of Crete, but he did not go and resigned. He returned to his old profession of diplomacy. In 1853, he was governor in Sinop and later the chief of the Ottoman Fleet.

PRIME MINISTER OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

            He was appointed as the prime minister of the Ottoman Empire with the recommendation of Reshit Pasha on 24 May 1854. He did not approve the war with Crimea and he was dismissed from his post after 6 months. In July 1855, he was the Speaker of the Ottoman Parliament which was opened during the Tanzimat (Reform) period. When the Prime Minister Ali Pasha went to participate at the Paris Conference in 1856, he was appointed as the First Under-Secretary of the Prime Minister. When peace agreement was signed with Russia, he was sent to St.Petersburg as extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador in August 1856. He was awarded by the Russian Tsar with the Eglban Order. He was appointed to the head of the Ottoman Fleet in 1858 for the second time and in the same year to the Parliament with a salary of 75.000 kurushes.

            In 1859 he became the grand vizier (prime minister) for the second time. Since he had a hard character and did not obey the given orders and he was in disagreement with the cabinet too, he was dismissed after three months from his post. He told the following day to the person who came to get his seal: “What do you think of me? Does Your Highness see me as a toy?”

            Since the Sultan wanted to use the experience of Mehmet Emin Pasha, he appointed him for the third time to the prime ministry, five months later in June 1860, which caused criticism.  Mehmet Emin Pasha had the post of Mufti of Rumeli simultaneously.

            He was dismissed once again from his post on 6 August 1861, because the Sultan Abdulaziz wanted to strengthen the army and the navy, whereas Mehmet Emin Pasha wanted to implement the reform programme (Islahat). He was given the post of governor of Edirne for the second time in 1861 and he stayed there for three years.

            He was appointed to the Ottoman Parliament in 1865 and he was awarded the Ottoman  Murassa (Prize) in 1866. He did not work after he left his last post as the head of the Supreme Court of Justice in 1867.

            When he died on 9 September 1871, he had no fortune other than his only 81 golden liras and a villa on the Bosphorus (in Kandilli) and the expences for his medical care and funeral was paid by Sultan Mahmut. His grave is in the Sultan Mahmut Moseleum in Istanbul.

HE LIKED CYPRUS AND THE CYPRIOTS A LOT

            Beside his mother tongue Turkish, he was in good command of the following languages: Arabic, Persian, French and Greek. He had an honest and rebellious character. He could resist the Sultan and tell his opinion freely. He used to like the Cypriots and help them especially in getting higher education. He helped his fellow countryman, Mehmet Kamil Pasha, in 1860, to get appointed to the Head of Evkaf in Cyprus, who later was four times Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire.

            According to George Hill, when Cyprus was included in the Vilayet of the Islands, a mission to Istanbul consisting of two Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots, headed by the Archbishop Sophronios II, who left on 26 May 1870, returning on 5 August. Their arguments were favoured by the Grand Vizier Kibrizli (Cypriot) Mehmed Pasha, a native of Paphos and  they quickly obtained the relief for which they asked, to wit, the withdrawal of Cyprus from the Vilayet of the Archipelago and its constitution as an independent Mütesarriflik, as well as permission to draw the necessary seed for the following tear from the Government granaries. Nevertheless, the independence thus conceded seems to have been very soon withdrawn, possibly when Midhat Pasha restored the Vilayet system which had been temporarily abolished by Mahmud Nedim Pasha in his first vezirate (1871-2).” (The History of Cyprus, Cambridge 1952, p.250)

            “By another special concession obtained through the influence of Kibrisli Mehmed Pasha, the conscripts recruited in Cyprus remained in the island during their term of service and formed the only military force at the disposal of the Governor. Their complete inefficiency, we are told, was conspicuous, the majority of them not having fired a shot, but their qualities were never put to serious test.” (ibid, p.251)

A BOOK BY HIS FIRST WIFE

            Melek Hanım (her maiden name was Marie Dejean) was the first wife of Kibrizli (the Cypriot) Mehmet Emin Pasha.

            Her Memoirs were published in 1872 by the Harper and Brothers Publishing House in New York under the title “Thirty Years in the Harem or the Autobiography of Melek Hanum, Wife of H.H.Kibrizli Mehemet Pasha.” (The Turkish translation by Ismail Yerguz was published in 1995 in Istanbul from the French edition and the book is called in Turkish “Haremden Mahrem Hatiralar: Melek Hanim”.

            Melek Hanım's grand-mother was Greek and her grand-father was Armenian. Her father was French and she met Mehmet Emin Pasha in Paris where he was serving as a military attaché at the Ottoman Embassy. When they returned to Istanbul, they lived in a house in Sultanahmet. They moved to Tophane after Abdulmedjit got into power. Melek Hanım gives us very important information in her memoirs about the daily life, wedding ceremonies and the Ottoman statesmen of those years in Istanbul.  

            Another book called “Memoirs of Kibrizlizade Major Osman Bey or the British in the 19th Century” was published in Izmir in 1996 (translated into Turkish by Ilhan Pinar) where the narrative of Mehmet Emin Pasha's son completes Melek Hanım's narrative. 

HIS CHILDREN

            Mehmet Emin Pasha married Feride, the daughter of Ali Riza Pasha, after he divorced his first wife. Shevket Pasha was his step son, but he fell into the river in Ishkodra and drowned. He had Atiye, her only child living. She got married with Tosun Pashazade Mustafa Bey, who later became Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire. Mehmet Emin Pasha gave her daughter on one condition that Mustafa Pasha would get the surname “Kibrizli”(Cypriot) and he did so. They had three sons (Nazim Bey, Shevket Bey and Talat Bey) and three daughters (Azize, Refika, Aliye).

            Nazim Bey visited Cyprus during the First World War. He stayed here until the war was over and he administered the farms which belonged to the family. (The total surface of the farms called Kukla, Mamonia, Ashelia and Bodima were 7,831 donums and a part of them was made public property by the British colonial government and later sold to the Greek Cypriots and the remaining properties were sold by Nazim Bey.)

            Shevket Bey was the body guard of Nazim Pasha, the President of the Sublime Porte and he was shot dead by Enver Pasha or his men. Talat Bey was a man of adventure. One of the grand-daughters of Mehmet Emin Pasha was Refika and her son, Emin Dirvana, as a retired lieutenant-colonel, was appointed to Cyprus in 1960 as the Ambassador of Turkey.

KNAPSACK AND MACE

            Radji Hodja tells the following story which he heard from the old people of Tera village:

            “During the days of Kibrizli Mehmet Pasha the taxes in Cyprus were very high. A Turkish Cypriot imam, called “Giavur Imam” of Tremithusa village was tempted by a priest, called Galoyiero, to rebel, but in the end both were arrested and beheaded. Mehmet Pasha accepted to have exemption for 30 years from taxes for those who would be settled in Cyprus. First, Emin Efendi,  the uncle of Mehmet Pasha, went to Istanbul and became the Head of the Exchequer of Abdulmedjit. He called the son of his brother, Mehmet, who was a shepherd, to Istanbul, convincing him that he would buy him a flock of sheep and that he had many farms in Istanbul. Mehmet took his beloved tasselled mace along with him and went to Istanbul. He was educated in the Ottoman Imperial Court (Enderun), learning excellent French and served as ambassador in France and Switzerland. He became three times the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, but he never forgot his tasselled mace which he took with him to Istanbul and kept in a special room. He used to visit this secret room sometimes and he never showed this room to anyone. The people surrounding him thought that he opted another religion and hid himself in that room for prayers. After being reported to the Sultan, Abdulmedjit came one day to Mehmet Emin Pasha's home and asked him to show what he hid in that room. When the Sultan saw the tasselled mace, he asked for an explanation. Mehmet Emin Pasha told him that he used to watch this mace and remember that he had been a shepherd before. By  visiting this room, he avoided becoming an arrogant person!

            Radji Hodja told also that Emin Efendi, the uncle of Mehmet Pasha was the father-in-law of Mehmet Akif, poet of the Turkish National Anthem.” (Hursoz newspaper, Nicosia, 26 August 1950)

(By Ahmet Djavit, Turkish Cypriot Historian, published in “The Cyprus Sun”,   April-May 2005)

 

MEHMET KIAMIL PAŞA (1832-1913)

           Mehmet Kiamil Pasha was a Turkish Cypriot who was appointed four times as the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire:

1^st period        25 September 1885-4 September 1891

2^nd period        2 October 1895-7 November 1895

3^rd period        5 August 1908-14 February 1909

4^th period        29 October 1912-23 January 1913

                                   ***

            Mehmet Kiamil Pasha was born in 1832 in Nicosia. His father was Salih Kiamil, a captain in the imperial Ottoman artillery corps which was sent to Cyprus from Anamur in 1821 during an attempt of rebellion of the Cypriots against the Ottoman rulers. Salih settled in Piroi village where he got married with Pembe Hanım of Deftera village.

            Mehmet Kiamil became an orphan at the age of 10 when his father died. Together with his brothers Shakir and Sadik, they were given to Zuhtu Efendi, a notable person from Nicosia for shelter. Mehmet went to medrese and later to a Greek Cypriot school. He could speak Greek as well.

            His father was a good friend of Mehmet Ali Pasha, first governor of Egypt and the three brothers were sent to Egypt for education. Kiamil started first to learn other foreign languages like English, French, Arabic and Persian, but the language school was later turned into a military college. After he completed his military education, he was employed by Abbas Pasha, the Hidive of Egypt, as court translator and as advisor. Together with the Hidive of Egypt, he travelled extensively in Europe.

            After ten years of service in Egypt, he was appointed in 1860, as the director of the Cyprus Moslem Religious Foundation (Evkaf) with a salary of 40 pounds. He served two and half years in this post and later he was the district officer (kaimakam) of Larnaca for four months. Afterwards he was appointed as the treasurer of the island, a post which he later continued in Syria. He served as an administrator in the region of today's Lebanon, Syria and Palestine for 15 years which helped him a lot in his future statesmanship.  

His statement to the “Times” during the Armenian rebellion in Zeytun was appreciated very much by the British in London and by the Sultan in Istanbul, because the British Consul had given wrong information.

            Between his appointments as grand vizier he served as governor of Beirut, Jerusalem and Herzogovina and as governor of the provinces of Kosova and Haleppo. Before his fourth appointment as grand vizier he served as Undersecretary to the Minister of Interior and later appointed as the Minister of Education and then Minister of Evkaf Properties.

            During the reign of Said Pasha, he was appointed as the Prime Minister of the Ottoman Empire on the recommendation of the Foreign Minister, Kara Todori Pasha with a salary of 75,000 kurushes. He stayed in this post for 6 years and later he was removed  to become governor of Aydin according to his wish. The Public Debts Question, the entrance of the foreign capital into the Ottoman Empire, the construction of the railways and the promotion of industry were the events during his reign of power. He was not compromising in the issue of revolting Armenians. When he was dismissed in 1891, the Sultan gave him a pension of monthly 40,000 kurushes. 

HIS SECOND TERM OF OFFICE

            In October 1895, the Sultan Abdulhamit was concerned of losing the throne after the pressure of the big European powers and due to the Armenian activities, he dismissed Said Pasha and appointed Kiamil Pasha for the second time to the post of Grand Vizier, because he was friendly with the British. In the same year, Kiamil Pasha increased his powers and proposed the election of the ministers by the Grand Vizier. Again Abdulhamit was suspicious of him and Kiamil was dismissed and sent to Izmir as governor where he served from 1895 to 1907. Because of the information sent to Abdulhamit against Kiamil Pasha, he was about to be sent to exile in Rhodes, Kiamil Pasha took refuge in the British Consulate in Izmir. After the Sultan was properly informed, he was pardoned and returned to Istanbul.

HIS THIRD TERM OF OFFICE

            Kiamil Pasha was appointed for the third time to the post of Prime Minister of the Ottoman Empire (Grand Vizier) on 5 August 1908 during a very critical time right after the proclamation of the second constitutional government. He took very courageous steps for the modernisation of the administration as he helped the convention of the Ottoman Parliament in the same year. In the elections made at the end of 1908, the supporters of the “Unity and Progress Association” had a very big success. He managed to use various political and religious groups against each other, but he, after a vote of inconfidence, resigned on 14 February 1909.

HIS VISIT TO CYPRUS

            Kiamil Pasha visited Cyprus in 1910, for the first time since the British occupation in 1878, together with his son Sabahattin and Muzaffer Bey. As he was coming to Nicosia via Larnaca, he stopped his carriage at his native village of Piroi and showed to his friends accompanying him, the house where he was born. After drinking from the water of his village, he came to Nicosia.

            He stayed for two weeks in Nicosia and later went to Egypt in order to see His Majesty George V who was about to leave for India. The King received him in the yacht of “Medina” and a picture was taken all together which showed Queen Mary and Kiamil Pasha sitting on the chairs. This was regarded as a respect to Kiamil Pasha who was without any title then.

            In the back row, from the left to the right were Extraordinary Commissioner of Egypt, Lord Kitchener, behind the Pasha, His Majesty the King, Hidive Abbas Hilmi Pasha, Older Prince Ziyaeddin Efendi, the brother of the Queen, Duke Doodd, the brother of Abbas Hilmi Pasha, Prince Mehmet Ali Pasha, Head-Commander of the Egyptian Army General Wikent.

HIS FOURTH TERM OF OFFICE

            After a rebellion by the religious elements who wanted to establish an order according to the rules of Koran, the Ottoman Army captured Istanbul and the Parliament dismissed Abdulhamit and appointed to his post his brother Mehmet Reshat. Kiamil Pasha was in 1912 the Head of the State Council in the cabinet of Ahmet Muhtar Pasha. The oppositional groups which were fighting against the “Unity and Progress Party” for a coalition government, made Kiamil Pasha the prime minister for the fourth time on 29 October 1912.

            He was already 80 years old when he took the power and the Ottoman Empire was under the threat of division. As he was about to talk in a cabinet meeting about the answer to be given to the big powers on 23 January 1913, he was removed from office with a raid on Sublime Porte.

HIS RETURN TO CYPRUS AND HIS DEATH

            Kiamil Pasha married four times. His son Hilmi Kiamil Bayur writes in his book (Sadrazam Kiamil Pasa-Siyasi Hayati, Sanat Basimevi, Ankara, 1954) in the chapter of “Kiamil Pasha and Cyprus” the following:

            “Kiamil Pasha had a deep love for the island he was born in and raised up. The first years of his service as civil servant were spent there. After he left Cyprus, the remaining close relatives continued the family there. 

            When he was high up in the state hierarchy, he used to help the Cypriots, coming to the fatherland for education, visit or work, as a faithful and benevolent fellow compatriot. On the other hand, he used to think of retreating one day to Cyprus, when he was confronted with the insecurities and undecidednesses of the political life in Istanbul. That was why he bought a small piece of land. Thus when he had to leave the country in 1913 because of political struggle, he did not go somewhere else and returned to Cyprus, where after a while he died.” (p.171)

            Let us read the following account of his return from his close friend Sir Harry Luke:

            “In May 1913, the veteran octogenarian statesman unexpectedly appeared in his native island, which he had not seen since he had ceased to govern it as far as 1864.

            The reason for the travels of the Grand Old Man of Turkey in the evening of his days was no happy one. On the 23rd of the previous January Enver Bey, as he was then, one of the most forceful of the Young Turk leaders, burst with some of his associates into the Sublime Porte while the Cabinet was actually in session, shot dead the Minister of War, the genial and popular Nazim Pasha, at the Council table and overturned literally by force Kiamil's fourth and last Ministry. Unable to remain in Turkey after this bloody coup, the ex-Grand Vizier was invited by his friend Lord Kitchener to stay with him in Cairo, and after three months in Egypt decided to await a favourable turn of fortune's wheel, such as patience had brought him on previous occasions during the many vicissitudes of his long and chequered career, in Cyprus. Suddenly conceived, then, as was his journey and unforeseen his arrival in the island, the provision of suitable accommodation for someone of His Highness's status presented a problem. As I was about to go to Troodos for the summer, I offered him the loan of my house during my absence, a suggestion the old gentleman was glad to accept.

            Kiamil had landed in Cyprus with only two attendants, a valet and a black eunuch, but five weeks later came the assassination of his Young Turk successor in the Grand Vizierate, Mahmud Shevket Pasha, possibly to avenge the murder of Nazim; and prominent Old Turks were either expelled or fled the country. These included Kiamil Pasha's family, who had hitherto been unmolested and now joined the old man in Nicosia. On my return from Troodos Kiamil took the house next to mine, which was roomier and could accommodate his greatly enlarged household. It was now a sight of considerable piquancy to watch from my windows his eldest son, Said Pasha, a decrepit roué and invalid of sixty or thereabouts, being wheeled up and down the ramparts for his morning airing in a bath-chair side by side with the push-cart containing His Highness's youngest son, aged five or six. An unusual pair of brothers.

            On the 14th November following his arrival in the island, while full of plans for revisiting England in 1914, Kiamil Pasha died suddenly of syncope while engaged in his morning correspondence, and was buried that afternoon by his and my friend and landlord, Taib Effendi, in the court of the Arab Ahmed Mosque of which Taib Effendi was the Imam. Truly Turkish in its contrasts and ups and downs had been his life; truly Turkish was his burial. After a service in S.Sophia, the great Mosque, the coffin was borne through the narrow streets of the walled town and beneath overhanging lattices to its last resting-place, followed by the highest and lowest in the island. Crowding upon the High Commissioner, the principal British officials and the Moslem dignitaries, the rabble of the town struggled and pushed, instigated partly by curiosity, partly by the hope of being able for the moment or two to take part in the bearing of the coffin.

            As the procession approached the Arab Ahmed Mosque with its swaying burden a flower-seller, dressed in the baggy white breeches of the Turkish peasant of Cyprus and with bare legs and clippers, joined the throng, laid aside the tray of violets he had brought into the bazaar for sale and put his shoulder under the coffin. It was the Grand Vizier's nephew, his sister's son, who grew flowers and vegetables in the neighbouring village of Deftera and had come into the town that afternoon to ply his trade. He encountered the procession accidentally, unaware of his uncle's death; but, when he learned who was being carried to burial, he took his place as a matter of course and no one thought his participation strange.”  (Cyprus- A Portrait and an Appreciation, London 1973, p.158-160)

            H.K.Bayur, writes that after he retreated to Cyprus, he brought his family from Istanbul to his near:

            “In the pictures taken a few days before he died, he was a strong man, walking. As usual, he used to read and write three to five hours a day regularly. He just started to write his memoirs about the development in the period of constitutional government. But his life did not last.   

            According to his wife Layika's account, he woke up early in the morning of 14 November 1913 and took his breakfast. He woke up his smallest son, 8-year-old Nazim to go to the school. When he returned to his room, he told his wife that he felt bad and asked his cardiac medicine which he used to take sometimes for relief. He could not have the time to get the medicine and lay on the couch and surrendered his soul without any difficulty. He died of arteriosclerosis. So he died in the country of his birth, on the soil of Cyprus with the age of 81. On that day, both the Mohammedans and the Christians, all the Cypriots were mourning. They buried him, who was raised amongst them up to the highest rank of the Ottoman Empire and played an important role in the fate of the empire in its critical days in the garden of the Arab Ahmet Mosque in Nicosia.” (ibid, s.397)

            The Times newspaper of London wrote on 14 November 1913 that the grand old man of Turkey died and that it would not be wrong to say that there was no other personality similar to him living then among the whole Ottoman high officials.  

            Sir Harry Luke writes that when Kiamil Pasha visited London for the Great Exhibition of 1851, there he began the daily reading of the Times. He told this to Luke in 1913 and that he had never interrupted since then for a single issue. (ibid, p.157-158)

            The personalities who took part in his funeral were the following:

            The British governor of Cyprus, Sir Hamilton John Gould Adams, Chief Kadi (Judge) Ali Rifat Efendi and the Mufti Hadji Hafız Ziyai, State Secretary Chief Judge Sir Teisser, The Treasurer, Commissioner of Nicosia Mr.Kate, Major of Nicosia A.Iliasides, Director of Education Mr. Newham, Kadi A.Muhiddin, Chief Inspector of Education Ibrahim Hakki, Chief Inspector of Mohammedan Schools Halil İbrahim, Hadji Dervish Pasha, Turkish Delegate of Evkaf  Musa Irfan, Retired Judge Ahmet İzzet, Dr.A.Esat, Dr.Nuri, Dr.Behich, Advocate Hafız Osman Djemal Bey and many other notables  and a big crowd. After the funeral, Advocate Hafiz Djemal Bey made a speech about him. After 14 years, the British Governor Sir Storrs made a new grave for him and opened it with a ceremony in 1928.

            He won many high decorations of the Ottoman Empire and other foreign countries. He opened 12 Ottoman schools for the benefit of the island's education. Laleli, Turunchlu, Tahtakale and Yeni Djami were among them.

            Kiamil Pasha was known as a man of integrity and intellectual capacity. He also made a name for himself as an able administrator and played a significant role in suppressing the Armenian revolts in Anatolia. His three-volume-work “The Political History of the High Ottomans”, published between 1909 and 1911 is considered to be an important source by the historians. Only the first volume of his three- volume-”Memoirs” was published. His booklet “Answers to Said Pasha” is considered to be a witty and brilliant piece of political writing. His private library was transported to Cyprus when he returned in 1913. These books, together with his decorations and other related documents, are currently kept in the Turkish Cypriot National Archives in Kyrenia.

(This second article was not published in The Cyprus Sun magazine. No information was given to the author!)

 

INTERVIEW WITH GNOMI NEWSPAPER

The T/C researcher-writer Dr. Ahmet Djavit An answers the questions of Gnomi newspaper on the Cyprus «problem»

«Only if we unite our forces, we can hope for a just and viable solution”

The T/C researcher- author Dr Ahmet Djavit, the man who dared sent the occupying forces to the European Court, an action that contributed to a domino of dramatic events, is not a man to hide behind words. An experienced scholar with deep understanding of the national question of Cyprus says the spade, a spade in the courageous and daring style that is part of his personality:

“The question is not which community will rule over the other,but which class forces will hold power in a future democratic, united and federal Cyprus.”

Dr Ahmet Djavit supports that the policies aiming at Enosis and Dihotomisis(partition) had always had the support of the NATO circles and the deep state through the underground organizations of TMT and EOKA. And he concludes:

“The left and the progressive forces in general have to find ways of eradicating the communal disagreements, ending the various manifestations of nationalism and separatism.”

***

- Could you outline the course of the national question in Cyprus in a brief way? - Which do you consider were the responsibilities of Makarios and Denktas in the shaping of the national question?

- There are historical and psychological reasons that in Cyprus two main distinct nationalities developed out of two religious groups, instead of one nation, although they shared a common history and some common cultural values since their co-existence starting from 1571. There used to be common and separate fields of cultural and communal structures even before the British colonial administration. The British colonialists put forward the differences, instead of similarities between the two communities, especially by importing the educational systems of Greece and Turkey respectively into Cyprus. By using the colonial divide and rule policy, they restructured the administrative system by helping the formation of nationalist groups, which they used in local politics. Instead of helping them to develop a common historical consciousness, the British remained silent so that Turkish and Greek nationalisms disseminated among the respective communities in Cyprus. The main political goal of the Greek Cypriots during the British colonial period was the union of the island with Greece, enosis, which excluded the Turkish Cypriots from a common struggle and forced them to seek shelter from the mainland Turkey. Again the British exploited these differing political aims and used the Turkish Cypriots against the anti-British rebellion of the Greek Cypriots. After the independence of the island in 1960, the two leaderships continued their so-called national aims, i.e. enosis and partition, which had both the support of the NATO deep state circles through the underground organisations, the TMT and the EOKA.

- To which degree did the involvement of Turkey and Greece affect the course of the Cyprus problem? - Which was the role of the British?

- In order to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, one should make distinction between the foreign interventions and the roots of the inter-ethnic conflict within the island. Both the imperialists and the local nationalists, be it Greek Cypriot nationalists or Turkish Cypriot separatists, depend themselves on the differences between the governing classes in both communities, by exploiting the old mistakes, which were the result of a wrong policy of nationalities. Turkey, Greece, Britain and the NATO as a whole are responsible for the non-solution of the Cyprus issue as an international problem.

- Do you believe that the period at which Talat and Christofias were the representatives of the two communities, was really a favourable “coincidence" for a solution?

- Since the ethnic-national composition of the Cypriot people is not homogeneous, the securing of the independence, territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus is very much related with the solving of the question of nationalities internally. But it is necessary to underline the fact that the determining factor is not the ethnic-national differences between the two main communities of the island, but the class struggle within Cyprus and on the international level. Therefore the problem is not which community will be governing which one, but which class forces will have the power in the future democratic, united and federal Cyprus. The question of nationalities is a big complex of problems, which emerge during the struggle of the peoples for political, economic, ideological, legal and social liberation. The solution depends on the creation of appropriate conditions internally and externally. I believe that these conditions were not created internally during the negotiations between Talat and Christophias. As for external factors, I still believe that the NATO and the EU are not sincere in the re-unification of the island.

- Except of their impressiveness, what do you think was the practical result of the stunning mobilizations of the t/cs under the banner of the Platform This Country is Ours?

-The mobilizations just coincided with the court decision of my legal case against Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (Djavit An vs Turkey, Application No.20652/92). The decision came out on 20 February 2003 and the gates were opened just two months later on 23 April 2003. The judgement of the court was the last drop in the glass that forced the Turkish Cypriot leadership to lift the travel restrictions across the dividing line. This fact is stated in a book, written by the lawyer of the Turkish Cypriot leadership in the ECHR, Zaim M. Necatigil, The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey in the grip of ECHR: Cases brought against Turkey by the Greek Cypriot Administration and the Greek Cypriots before the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights (in Turkish). Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2005, p. 190.

- Is there really a hope for a fair-viable solution to the Cyprus Problem? What do you think must be the role of the Left and the progressive forces in general within this setting?

- The Anglo-American imperialism had planned to realize the enosis or the taksim of the island years ago and they managed to exploit our internal conflict and finally to partition our island. There have been mistakes of both leaderships in this respect. The majority community had more responsibility in order to unite the whole population without any discrimination of ethnic origin, nationality, religion or language. The left and the progressive forces in general have to find ways of eradicating the communal disagreements, ending the various manifestations of nationalism and separatism, getting rid of developmental socio-economic differences, building a friendly mutual relationship based on real equal citizenship in a democratic federal state. Here lies the big responsibility of the AKEL, which is supposed to be the party of the working class of Cyprus. The AKEL has to revise its policy for the Turkish Cypriots by opening its Turkish Cypriot branch as soon as possible.

Yiorgos Sofokleous for Gnomi newspaper - Translation, Soteris Vlachos.
Published in “GNOMI” newspaper Friday, 10 January 2014