AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application No. 20652/92 by Ahmet DJAVIT AN against Turkey

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 14 April 1998, the following members being present:
           MM    S. TRECHSEL, President
                 J.-C. GEUS
                 G. JÖRUNDSSON
                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
                 A. WEITZEL
                 J.-C. SOYER
                 H. DANELIUS
           Mrs   G.H. THUNE
           MM    F. MARTINEZ
                 C.L. ROZAKIS
           Mrs   J. LIDDY
           MM    L. LOUCAIDES
                 M.A. NOWICKI
                 I. CABRAL BARRETO
                 N. BRATZA
                 I. BÉKÉS
                 J. MUCHA
                 D. SVÁBY
                 G. RESS
                 A. PERENIC
                 C. BÎRSAN
                 P. LORENZEN
                 K. HERNDL
                 E. BIELIUNAS
                 E.A. ALKEMA
                 M. VILA AMIGÓ
           Mrs   M. HION
           MM    R. NICOLINI
                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Mr    M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the Commission.

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 8 September 1992 by Ahmet DJAVIT AN against Turkey and registered on 18 September 1992 under file No. 20652/92;

      Having regard to :

-     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
      the Commission;

-     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
      1 July 1997 and the observations in reply submitted by the
      applicant on 30 September 1997;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant, a Cypriot national born in 1950, is a paediatrician residing in Nicosia, north of the "green line". Before the Commission he is represented by Mr. Malcolm Shaw, a barrister practising in London.

      The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:

A.    The particular circumstances of the case

      In addition to being a critic of the Turkish Cypriot authorities and of the Turkish military presence in the northern part of Cyprus, which he qualifies as "occupation", the applicant is the "Turkish Cypriot Coordinator" of "the Movement for an Independent and Federal Cyprus", an unregistered association of Turkish and Greek Cypriots founded in 1989 in Nicosia. The movement has a Turkish Cypriot coordinating committee in the northern part of the island and a Greek Cypriot coordinating committee in the southern part. The purpose of
this Movement is to develop close relations between the two communities. To this end, it organises bi-communal meetings of political, cultural, medical or social character.

      In general, the applicant cannot obtain a permit from the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities to visit the "buffer zone" or the southern part of the island. Thus, between 23 September 1989 and 3 October 1996, only 22 out of 124 requests for such permits were
granted. One of the requests that were turned down concerned the UNFICYP (United Nations Forces in Cyprus) Spring Fair at the Nicosia International Airport in May 1992 and another a bi-communal medical seminar organised by UNHCR in June 1992. Moreover, in May 1992 the above-mentioned authorities refused to allow Greek Cypriots to attend a meeting organised by the applicant in the northern part of the island.

      The applicant claims that there exists a decision by the cabinet of the "TRNC" prohibiting his contacts with Greek Cypriots. Reference to this decision is allegedly made in a letter dated 3 February 1992 by the "Health Minister of the TRNC" to the applicant, which reads as
follows:

      "According to the information our Ministry received, you were informed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence orally and this has been a decision of the government and we have nothing to add in our capacity as the Ministry."

      On 7 May 1992 the applicant wrote to the Prime Minister of the "TRNC" requesting to be informed of the content of the cabinet decision referred to in the above-mentioned letter, but received no reply.

      On 29 May 1992 he sent a letter of protest to the Foreign Minister of Turkey, which has also remained unanswered.

      On 18 May 1994 the "Directorate of Consular and Minority Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the TRNC" informed the applicant that "the permission requested by (his) letter of 19 April 1994 was refused for security reasons, in the public interest and because (he) made propaganda against the state."

B.    Applicant's previous application

      On 13 May 1991 the applicant and four other Turkish Cypriots filed an application against Cyprus before the European Commission of Human Rights complaining about the restrictions of their freedom of movement. The Commission found that the Government of Cyprus "could not be held responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for the acts of Turkish Cypriot authorities in the north of Cyprus" and declared their application inadmissible (No. 18270/92, Ahmet Cavit AN and others v. Cyprus, Dec. 8.10.91, unpublished).

      The applicant claims that the attitude of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities towards him has become even stricter following his first application to the Commission.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities, by not allowing him to cross the "green line", prohibit him from exercising his right to freedom of assembly and association  with the Greek Cypriots as well as his right to freedom of expression including the freedom to hold opinions and ideas and to receive and impart information.

2.    The applicant complains under Article 13 of the Convention about the lack of effective domestic remedies to challenge the arbitrary refusal to allow him to cross the "green line" for the purpose of taking part in meetings organised in the southern part of the island.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 8 September 1992 and registered on 18 September 1992.

      On 27 June 1994 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government without requesting any observations.

      On 8 April 1995 the Commission decided to adjourn the examination of the application pending delivery of the Court's judgment on the merits of the Loizidou v. Turkey case. The judgment was delivered on 18 December 1996 (cf. Reports 1996-IV).

      On 23 January 1997 the Commission decided to request the respondent Government to submit observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.

      On 2 April 1997 the respondent Government requested the Commission to adjourn the examination of the case until completion by the Court of its consideration of the issue under Article 50 of the Convention in the Loizidou v. Turkey case. On 18 April 1997 the Commission decided not to accede to the respondent Government's request and fixed a new time-limit for the submission of their observations.

      The Government's written observations were submitted on 1 July 1997, after an extension of the second time-limit fixed for that purpose. The applicant replied on 30 September 1997.


THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains under Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention that the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities, by not allowing him to cross the "green line", prevent him from exercising his right to freedom of assembly and association  with the Greek
Cypriots as well as his right to freedom of expression including the freedom to hold opinions and ideas and to receive and impart information. He also complains under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention about the lack of effective domestic remedies to challenge the arbitrary refusal to allow him to cross the "green line".

      The provisions invoked by the applicant provide as follows:

      Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention

      "1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and       impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...

      2.   The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary."

      Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention

      "1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

      2.   No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. ..."

      Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."

2.    The respondent Government submit that they are not responsible for the decisions of the "TRNC" preventing the applicant from crossing the "green line". Although the applicant alleges that it was the Turkish military authorities which prevented him from crossing this
line, he himself confirms that all the applications for a permit he has lodged were addressed to the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Moreover, the Government submit that the control and day-to-day administration of the crossing gates of the "TRNC" belong to the authorities of the "TRNC" which are also responsible for issuing the relevant permits.
Furthermore, it is the laws of the "TRNC" which apply to the matter in question. The applicant himself chose to protest to the "Prime Minister of the TRNC".

      The respondent Government further contend that there is no military occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkey, but rather that there has been an evolution towards the creation of their own independent State by the Turkish Cypriot community in exercise of their right to
self-determination. In this respect, the respondent Government refer in detail to the history of Cyprus since 1960 emphasising in particular:

      (i) the bi-communal character of the 1960 Constitution and the obligation of Cyprus, under international treaty obligations guaranteed by the signatories of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, to maintain her independence, territorial integrity and the fundamental principles of the Constitution;

      (ii) the alleged responsibility of the Greek Cypriot side for the breakdown of the 1960 constitutional arrangements in 1963 and the subsequent changing of basic principles of the Constitution;

      (iii) the allegedly intolerable situation of enclaved Turkish Cypriots in the period between 1964 and 1974, which caused them to set up their own administration as from December 1967;

      (iv) the fact that the Turkish intervention in July 1974 was preceded by a coup d'etat of Greek officers of the National Guard who pursued the aim of unification of Cyprus with Greece (Enosis);

      (v) the contention that the Turkish military operation in 1974 was carried out in conformity with Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee to protect the right of Turkish Cypriots;

      (vi) the contention that the subsequent relocation of both the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities in separate parts of the island was the result of agreements achieved in inter-communal talks held in Vienna in July/August 1975, these agreements being fully implemented on a voluntary basis under UN auspices, UN troops moving
into the newly established buffer zone;

      (vii) the alleged agreement achieved in 1977 and 1979 between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders for seeking a federal solution on the basis of a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, a concept which it is contended is still valid as a basic guideline for
the inter-communal talks;

      (viii) the contention that the establishment of the "TRNC" as an independent State on 15 November 1983 was declared by the legitimate representative body of the Turkish Cypriots in exercise of their right to self-determination, and that this did not constitute secession as the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus had ceased to function due to the actions of the Greek Cypriot side since 1963;

      (ix) the contention that the subsequent development of "TRNC" institutions was legitimate and in line with democratic principles and that it consolidated the statehood of the "TRNC" according to criteria accepted in international law;

      (x) the opinion that, despite the fact that it has not been recognised de jure by any other State than Turkey, the "TRNC" exists de facto as an independent State exercising all branches of State power on its territory (in this connection the respondent Government refer to several decisions of English courts recognising that there was "an effective and autonomous administration in the North" and to the fact that Turkey, having recognised the "TRNC" de jure, does not claim for herself to exercise power in that area);

      Finally, as regards the role of the Turkish forces in northern Cyprus, the respondent Government claim that these forces are there in a peace-keeping function at the request and with the consent of the "TRNC", that they act under the latter's authority and do not themselves exercise governmental power. It is claimed that their status is not essentially different from that of Greek military forces in southern Cyprus.

      The Government draw further arguments from the Commission's Report of 8 July 1993 in Chrysostomos and Papachrysostomou v. Turkey (D.R. 86-A, p. 4) in which the Commission found that certain legal acts emanating from the "TRNC" had to be assumed to be legally valid acts under the Convention. According to the Government, this opinion remains controlling for the Commission notwithstanding the Court's Loizidou v. Turkey judgment of 18 December 1996 (Reports 1996-I) which, as the Government emphasise, binds only the parties in that case and has no broader legally-binding effect. In any event, the Government argue that the Loizidou v. Turkey judgment is ultra vires.

      In the light of all the above, the respondent Government submit that Turkey has no accountability, control, jurisdiction or responsibility in respect of the acts of the "TRNC" which constitute the basis of the applicant's complaints.

      The applicant does not consider it necessary to comment on the general historical exegesis provided by the respondent Government, which in any event he does not accept. He refers in reply to the Court's Loizidou v. Turkey judgment of 18 December 1996 (supra) which he considers to be determinative as to certain crucial legal issues, as evidenced by the Commission's decision to adjourn the examination of his application pending its delivery.    He also refers to the Commission's decision of 7 September 1996 in the fourth inter-State
case (No. 25781/94 Cyprus v. Turkey, D.R. 86-A, p. 104) which is in line with the approach of the Court.

      The applicant recalls that in its Loizidou v. Turkey judgment of 18 December 1996 the Court found that Turkey exercises "effective overall control" in northern Cyprus, which includes not only direct actions and omissions of the Turkish authorities but also actions and
omissions of the "TRNC". According to the Court, what matters is "effective overall control" and not "the actual exercise of control", as the respondent Government contend. The notion of "actual exercise of control" was rejected by the Commission itself in its Chrysostomos
and Papachrysostomou v. Turkey Report, when it linked the question of imputability to the Turkish troops' being capable to intervene (supra, p. 27, paras. 99-102). The applicant submits that the respondent Government cannot use the proceedings before the Commission in the
present case to appeal against the Loizidou v. Turkey judgment of the Court.

      The applicant also refers to the Commission's finding in its Chrysostomos and Papachrysostomou v. Turkey Report that the actual control of the border area is exercised by Turkish armed forces. Moreover, he recalls that in its admissibility decision in the fourth
Cyprus v. Turkey case the Commission found that the applicant Government had sufficiently demonstrated the possibility of a direct or indirect involvement of Turkish authorities, inter alia, in the restriction of freedom of movement of Turkish Cypriots, including the
applicant. Finally, he points out that, in addition to having protested to the Turkish Cypriot authorities, on 29 May 1992 he sent a letter to the Foreign Minister of Turkey.

      The Commission recalls that the Court in its Loizidou v. Turkey judgment of 18 December 1996 found that

      "(i)t is not necessary to determine whether, as the applicant and the Government of Cyprus have suggested, Turkey actually       exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities of the 'TRNC'. It is obvious from the large number of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus that her army exercises effective overall control over that part of the island. Such control, according to the relevant test and in the circumstances of the case, entails her responsibility for the policies and actions of the 'TRNC'. Those affected by such policies or actions therefore come within the 'jurisdiction' of Turkey for the purposes of Article 1 (Art. 1) of the Convention. Her obligation to secure to the applicant the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention therefore extends to the northern part of Cyprus" (supra, pp. 2235-2236, para. 56).

      Moreover, the Commission notes that underlying the applicant's complaints is his inability to cross the "green line", an area over which the Commission has already found that the Turkish armed forces have actual control (Chrysostomos and Papachrysostomou v. Turkey
Report, supra, p. 4, para. 99). It follows that the acts complained of are imputable to Turkey. As a result, the Commission considers that it cannot reject the application as inadmissible ratione personae.

3.    The Commission will then examine whether the application has been lodged within the six-month time-limit provided for under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention. The Commission notes in this connection that the applicant complains about the general effect which the refusal of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities to allow him to cross the "green line" has had on his enjoyment of several Convention rights. However, the Commission cannot lose sight of the fact that in reality the applicant complains about a series of incidents some of which occurred more than six months before the lodging of the present
application on 8 September 1992.

      Under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention the Commission may only deal with a matter within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken. As a result, the Commission considers that it must declare inadmissible under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention the part of the application which relates to the period before 8 March 1992.

4.    Moreover, the Commission notes that the respondent Government argue that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies. They point out that the applicant is a Turkish Cypriot who lives in the "TRNC" and to whom all effective remedies within the judicial and
administrative system of the "TRNC" are accessible.

      The Government stress in this connection that the "TRNC" is endowed with a Constitution based on the principles of the rule of law and supremacy of the Constitution (Articles 1 and 7), which provides for an independent judiciary (Articles 136, 137, 141 and 150) and for
effective judicial control of executive and legislative activity (Articles 146-148 and 152). Article 17 relating to fair and public hearing is similar to Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention and prohibits the establishment of judicial committees or special courts under any name whatsoever. According to the Constitution, no act of the administration can be excluded from judicial review. Article 152 provides for judicial review of administrative action on the grounds of excess and/or abuse of power, illegality and unconstitutionality. There is also provision for judicial review of legislation by way of reference to the Supreme Constitutional Court (Article 148) and institution of proceedings for annulment of legislation and subsidiary
legislation (Article 147).

      The respondent Government claim that the existence of an effective and independent judicial system in the "TRNC" has also been recognised in the Commission's own case-law. They refer again to the Commission's Chrysostomos and Papachrysostomou v. Turkey Report
(supra). According to the Government, in paragraph 174 of that report the Commission recognised the existence of effective remedies before the national authorities in northern Cyprus when it noted that the applicants in that case had been brought before judicial authorities which they refused to recognise, and that they had not wished to avail themselves of such remedies as might have been available to them with regard to the circumstances of their arrest by Turkish Cypriot police.

      In this connection, the respondent Government submit a list of cases brought by Greek Cypriots in Turkish Cypriot courts including inter alia cases relating to trespass by other persons and unlawful cultivation of land belonging to Greek Cypriot plaintiffs in the Karpas
area. Such claims were accepted by the competent "TRNC" courts.

      In the Government's view, the applicant could have used the remedies which exist in the "TRNC". Moreover, he could have complained to the Attorney General of the "TRNC". Since he did not do so, he has failed to comply with Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

      The applicant submits first that the remedies under the "TRNC" Constitution are illegal in that they emanate from an illegal entity established pursuant to an illegal invasion and occupation by Turkey.

      Secondly, he points out that it is the Turkish authorities that have the ultimate control and responsibility in northern Cyprus. They also have effective control over border crossings. As a result and in the light of the Loizidou v. Turkey judgment of the Court, "TRNC"-based remedies cannot in principle be adequate and effective. In any event, the decisions of the Turkish Cypriot courts are not binding on the Turkish military authorities. The decisions to which the respondent Government refer revolve around conflicts of private law rights and do
not concern issues involving directly the Turkish authorities.

      Thirdly, the applicant submits that there is no law in the northern part of Cyprus regulating contacts between that part and the southern part. Decisions affecting him have not been communicated to him in writing and he has been the subject of veiled threats. As a
result, he has been unable to discover any proper legal basis for his treatment. In any event, when an application for a permit to cross the "green line" is rejected, no written reply is issued. The police at the control point, to whom the authorities send a circular with the list
of persons permitted to cross over, simply do not permit the passage. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot courts are likely to treat the freedom of movement between the two parts of the island as a political matter which is not judicially reviewable.

      Finally, the applicant argues that the arbitrary and erratic practices in the matter of permits for crossing over to the southern part fall within the administrative-practice exception to the
exhaustion of domestic remedies rule.

      The Commission recalls that, according to the Convention organs' case-law,

      "(i)t is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say, that it was accessible, was one which was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant's complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success" (Eur. Court HR, Akdivar and others v. Turkey judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, no. 15, p. 1211, para. 68).

      The Commission notes that the only remedies which the respondent Government claim that the applicant should have exhausted are remedies before bodies set up by the "TRNC". However, the Commission recalls that in its admissibility decision in the fourth inter-State case (No. 25781/94 Cyprus v. Turkey, supra) it considered that the question of whether "TRNC" courts are capable of providing redress, inter alia, in respect of complaints by Turkish Cypriots living in the northern part of Cyprus could only be determined at the merits stage of the proceedings. The Commission considers that it must reach the same conclusion in the circumstances of the present case. As a result, the Commission decides to reserve the final determination of the question of whether the applicant is required to pursue his complaints further before bodies established by the "TRNC" for a later stage in the proceedings.

      It follows that the part of the application which has been submitted within the six-month time-limit cannot be rejected as inadmissible under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention on the ground that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies.

5.     As regards the substance of the complaints, the Government argue that they concern freedom of movement. In their view, the applicant has failed to demonstrate how the alleged instances of restriction on his movement have affected his freedom of expression and association, given the nature of the meetings he wished to attend, namely a Spring Fair
and a bi-communal medical seminar. They also submit that the applicant cannot complain on behalf of the Greek Cypriots who were allegedly prevented from attending the meeting he had organised in the northern part of the island. Moreover, the Government argue that the applicant has exercised his freedom of expression through the media and other means available to him in the "TRNC" and elsewhere. In any event, the exercise of the rights invoked by the applicant is subject to restrictions under the second paragraph of the relevant provisions of the Convention.

        The applicant submits that he does not complain of restrictions of freedom of movement as such. The applicant is seeking to assert his rights to communicate his ideas and appropriate information to those on the island of Cyprus who share his aims of a peaceful resolution of
the problems of the island and to receive similar ideas and information. In this respect, his case is analogous to that of Loizidou v. Turkey where the issue of freedom of movement was considered by the Court to be a peripheral aspect of the core complaint concerning the
right to property.

      In the circumstances of the current situation in Cyprus, the applicant feels that it is only by meetings of Turkish and Greek Cypriots that ideas for a peaceful political settlement can be truly imparted, received and exchanged as envisaged by Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention. Such meetings cannot be held in the northern part of Cyprus. He also submits that Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention protects inter alia the gathering together of persons. Moreover, the term "association" has an autonomous meaning. It requires a minimum of organisation and stability and the Movement for an Independent and
Federal Cyprus fulfils these criteria.

      The  applicant contends that by not allowing him to cross over to the southern part, the authorities for which the respondent Government are responsible have interfered with these rights. However, there was no law regulating this interference. The Government have made
no effort to indicate the grounds on which such an interference may be justified. Nor have they shown it to be necessary in a democratic society. It follows that Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention have been violated. Moreover, for the reasons already set forth, the applicant considers that he has no effective remedy in respect of these violations.

      The Commission, in the light of the parties' observations, considers that the part of the application which has been submitted within the six-month time-limit raises serious questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits. This part of the application cannot, therefore, be regarded as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the application insofar as it concerns the refusal to allow the applicant to cross the "green line" before 8 March 1992;

      DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the remainder
of the application.

        M. de SALVIA                         S. TRECHSEL
         Secretary                            President
     to the Commission                    of the Commission

SECRET/EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM FOR KISSINGER (August 14,1974)

SECRET/EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM FOR KISSINGER FROM THE COUNSELOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON: “...privately assure Turks we will get them a solution involving one third of the island, within some kind of federal arrangement.”

A shocking August 14, 1974, “SECRET/EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY” from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the U.S. State Department, to Secretary Henry Kissinger became public a few weeks ago. It was published in the Cyprus Weekly of August 10, 2007.

The text of this important document follows:

“THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 14, 1974
SECRET/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY
FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Cyprus Actions

You wanted some brief ideas on what we do next.

Nothing I can think of will stop the Turks now from trying to secure by force what they demanded in their ultimata. In fact, as has always been true, the only conceivable modus vivendi will have to rest on a de facto division of the island, whatever the form.

If the Turks move fast and can then be gotten to stand down, it may pre-empt Greek counteraction and then give us a chance to try for a deal. (It may also save Karamanlis).

While the Soviets can serve as a bogey, we must keep them at arms length. They cannot become the arbiter between US allies. Their interests differ drastically from ours: we want a modus vivendi between Greece and Turkey, they want a non-aligned Cyprus, preferably with Greece or Turkey or both disaffected from NATO.

Thus, we should

•  urgently try to contain Greek reaction; 24 hours at a time;
•  bluntly tell the Turks they must stop, today, tomorrow at the latest;
•  warn the Turks that Greece is rapidly moving leftward;
•  send high-level US man to Athens to exert continuing direct influence on Karamanlis;
•  assuming the Turks quickly take Famagusta, privately assure Turks we will get them a solution  involving one third of the island, within some kind of federal arrangement;
•  assure Greeks we will contain Turk demands and allow no additional enclaves, etc.

You should not get involved directly till the fighting stops; then you must since there is no alternative and only we have the clout.

I do not think Brussels/NATO is the place to use when the time comes. The Greeks are probably too sore at NATO and the vehicle of a ministerial meeting is awkward. Anyway, you need Ecevit and Karamanlis.

London may be unacceptable to the Turks because of Callaghan’s blast at them.
You should not shuttle.”

STOP, MR JOURNALIST by Dervish Ali Kavazoglu

(from a blog in wordpress.com)
DERVISH ALI KAVAZOGLU AND COSTAS MISHAULIS (picture)

These two lovely people were the real Cypriots who gave their lives for their people. May they rest in peace, for those who wanted them dead as well as those who killed them, may they burn in hell.
The four TMT men who were involved, had an accident not to far from the location in early 70s, when a JCB went to help pull them out of their vehicle, it slipped and crashed them to death. A fifth deaf and dumb person in the vehicle came out unscratched.
Long live all Cypriots.

on April 11, 2011 at 13:40 | Reply Tim Drayton 

Perhaps on this occasion I could post here a translation I made from Turkish into English of a 1964 article by Derviş A. Kavazoğlu that I first posted on another site a few years ago. The article was published in the Bulgarian Communist Party’s Turkish-language newspaper “Yeni Işık” on 20 October 1964 and I found it in Ahmet An’s book “TMT’NİN KURBANLARI” (TMT’S VICTIMS). I am just the translator, so please do not attack me if you disagree with his ideas. I am just happy to post this in memory of the anniversary of his demise.

Incidentally, the poster you have displayed above is hanging from many pillars beside the streets of the Limassol suburbs of Nesa Geitonia and Agios Athanasios today.

The translation of the article, entitled “STOP, MR JOURNALIST”, follows:
——————————————————————-

What a gem of truth was spoken about us by the Bulgarian Turk, 67-year-old grandfather Kadir Hüseyin.

From what I have heard, a group of five journalists from Turkey recently came to Bulgaria.

One particular gentleman from among this group of journalists apparently collared the 67-year-old Bulgarian Turkish grandfather Kadir Hüseyin and would not be satisfied until he had imposed his views on the old man:

- “Don’t you know, dad,” said the journalist, “The Greek Cypriot gavurs are slaughtering our Turkish brothers in Cyprus for no reason.” Grandfather Kadir Hüseyin had clearly seen and heard plenty of things like this in his 67 years and was ready with the reply:

-“For heaven’s sake, my good Sir, somebody must be putting them up to it [herhalde onları kestirenler var]”. The journalist, not expecting such a reply, lost his temper and reprimanded him with the words:

-“You seem to have lost your Turkishness, old man.”

Hold on, journalist, don’t be in such a hurry. Grandfather Kadir Hüseyin has not lost his Turkishness, or anything like that, he just has no time for charlatanism and demagogy. According to you, the grandfather’s entire fault is that he is this way inclined.

Anyhow, leave Bulgarian grandfather Kadir be and come and talk to me, a Turkish Cypriot; listen to me Mr journalist. Bulgarian Turks, lend an ear, too. Grandfather Kadir, you lend an ear as well.

Let me start by saying that thirty thousand of the nearly one hundred and ten thousand Turkish Cypriots have been driven into a life devoid of civilisation and humanity, living in cinemas and like nomads in tents on the open plain, away from hearth and home, far from the soil which they had tended with the sweat of their own brow and yearning for the places where they were born and grew up! But why?

For ten months the vast majority of the Turkish Cypriot community has been condemned to a life of unemployment, hunger, absence of medicine and wretchedness! But why?

According to Rauf Denktash’s group, having taken charge of the Turkish Cypriot community by coercion, armed force and fascist methods and with the support of the imperialists and, at the time, of the reactionaries grouped around Menderes, the blame for the Turkish Cypriot community’s current woes lies with them, fairly and squarely with the Greek Cypriots. However, I will attempt to demonstrate with evidence that this claim is nothing more than baseless demagogy and that the blame and guilt for the Turkish Cypriot’s current woeful situation rests in the final analysis with the imperialists and the fascist Denktash group that is their tool.

I shall examine Emin Dirvana’s article as the first piece of evidence. Emin Dirvana, who was appointed as ambassador to Cyprus by the National Unity Committee government which took charge in Turkey following the 27 May action and who gained the love and respect of the Turkish Cypriot community – with the exception of Denktash’s fascist group – during the two years in which he served as ambassador, wrote the following in a long article which was published in the Milliyet newspaper in may 1964:

“…For the time in which I was in Cyprus in the capacity of ambassador not a single Turkish Cypriot’s home was destroyed and burnt. Not a single Turk was shot at by Greek Cypriots; nobody at all rejected Turkish rights in Cyprus…”

Mr Emin Dirvana, having stated these facts, wrote the following, exposing the true face of Rauf Denktash, the head of the fascist group:

“Denktash needs to comprehend the responsibility that he has, as head of the Turkish Cypriot Community Assembly, to the Turkish Cypriots and to the Turkish government.” “I attempted in vain for months to caution Denktash to concentrate his efforts on matters concerning the Turkish community’s development. But Denktash preferred to quarrel with the Greek Cypriots, on several occasions without cause, over and above considering the Turkish community’s development.”

Did you hear, Mr journalist, who was the cause of quarrels and fights between the Greeks and Turks? Or, in your estimation, has Mr Emin Dirvana also lost his Turkishness? No, mate. I don’t think you’d go that far!

Now, let’s move on and hear from Denktash himself who was responsible for driving 30 thousand Turkish Cypriots from their homes and turning them into nomads. Denktash said precisely the following in an interview broadcast on the evening of 22 March 1964 on a programme entitled “Window on the World”:

“We wish to establish a federal administration in Cyprus. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to move a portion of the Turks from one place to another place and to concentrate our people in certain parts of the island.”

Are you listening Mr journalist? You who are determined to set out on a mission to stir up the Bulgarian Turks with the demagogy that “The Greek Cypriot gavurs are slaughtering our Turkish brothers in Cyprus for no reason.” Denktash in that interview himself admits that 30 thousand Turks were made homeless, not to escape slaughter at the hands of Greek Cypriots, but were forcibly uprooted from their homes by himself and like-minded people.

Denktash and those who think like him have lied to the Turkish Cypriots in order to satisfy their own racist political ambitions and to benefit their masters, the imperialists, and have uprooted 30 thousand of our brothers from their homes and villages by exploiting the Turkish Cypriot peoples’ decent national sentiments with demagogy about “mass murder” and driven the Turkish Cypriot community into its present woeful state!
Denktash and those who think like him have deceived a section of our population with talk of a “national struggle” and whipped them up into a frenzy; they have caused the deaths of hundreds of Turks and as many Greeks and caused them to kill one another.
A brief examination of the history of Cyprus over the past ten years easily reveals that the thing that Denktash calls the “national struggle” amounts to nothing more than serving the British and American imperialists.

Here I will try to give a few examples from this history.

The year was 1954. In the British parliament Mr Henry Hopkinson states that “The status quo on Cyprus will never change”, i.e. British imperialism will never grant Cyprus freedom and independence. Britain in the same year argued at a General Council meeting of the United Nations organisation that “the Cyprus problem is a domestic affair.”
In the same year, the “thesis” with the name “the Turkish thesis” that was defended by the imprudent Turkish leaders in Cyprus and the Menderes administration was absolutely identical to the British thesis. Such that at the General Council meeting of the United Nations a representative of the Democratic Party government defended, in common with the British representative, the thesis that “the Cyprus problem is Great Britain’s domestic affair, thus the United Nations has no right to interfere in member state’s domestic affairs.”

The year was 1955. September. Britain changes its policy and at the Tripartite London Conference offers Cyprus limited home rule. Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, who was participating at the same conference and at the time was representing the Deocratic Party government, announces that the limited home rule offered by Britian was accepted by the Turks and in passing mentions “equal representational rights”.

The year was 1956. December. The Greek Cypriot community having rejected the British offer of limited home rule, the British imperialists this time propose the Radcliffe constitution. On 20 December 1956 the Turkish prime-minister at the time Adnan Menderes announces that “the Radcliffe constitution is a reasonable basis for discussion.” The imprudent Turkish leaders in Cyprus also state that they accept the Radcliffe constitution. However, as is known, the Radcliffe constitution is not based on the “equal representational rights” to which Zorlu had referred in 1955. Thus, the so-called “Turkish thesis” kept step with British policy in line with the wishes of the imperialists.

Subsequently, the Greek Cypriot community having rejected the Radcliffe constitution that did not grant Cyprus full independence, the notion of “partitioning Cyprus” began to be floated around in the British parliament, purely with the aim of instilling fear and serving their own imperialist interests.

The Menderes administration and those who had been imposed by force on the Turkish Cypriot community as leaders accept the notion of “partitioning Cyprus” first floated by Britain, which wished to retain Cyprus as a springboard, a warship and an aircraft carrier so that it may protect its own imperialist interests in the Middle East, continue to steal petrol in this area and stifle the Arab people’s wars of national liberation, for these very purposes and present this divisive policy of the British imperialists as “Turkish policy”.

Henceforth, the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish people are whipped up with slogans of “partition or death” and the conditions are created for the first intercommunal conflict in Cyprus.

Subsequently the British imperialists come up with a new imperialistic plan for Cyprus named the “Macmillan Plan”. The same people who had sent the Turkish Cypriot community to its death with the slogan “partition or death” now immediately consented to the Macmillan Plan. However, this plan was not based on “Partition” or anything like it.

When the Greek Cypriot community also fail to accept this invention of imperialism known as the “Macmillan Plan”, the so-called Turkish Cypriot leaders and Menderes administrators fall in behind the British in the quest for other imperialist inventions and the Zurich-London agreements appear on the scene.

The Zurich and London agreements, which served no other purpose than to drive a wedge and sow the seeds of enmity between the Greek and Turkish communities that had lived in a spirit of peace and mutual assistance in Cyprus for over four hundred years, whip up nationalist hysteria and create separatism were imposed on both communities and these agreements were not submitted to a referendum.

From three years of experience it became abundantly clear that these agreements along with the constitution and state based on these agreements were incapable of working normally.

Consequently, President Makarios proposed that the constitution be amended in order that the state may function normally and submitted a 13-point draft for discussion. This 13-point draft did not essentially infringe on the Turkish Cypriot community’s genuine and democratic rights. However, neither the so-called Turkish leaders in Cyprus or Turkey showed any inclination to discuss the draft. As a result of this the political atmosphere in Cyprus became electrified. Imperialism managed to exploit this electric atmosphere and on 23 December 1963 by means of its agents conflict began.

The conflict which has continued until today has claimed the lives of hundreds of Turkish and Greek Cypriots, destroyed families and turned women into widows and innocent children into orphans. For the sake of the interests of imperialism and its organs, Turkish Cypriots as a whole have been taken to the brink of disaster.

Had the parties sat down at a round table to negotiate the 13-point draft which President Makarios had submitted to make the constitution workable, the current disaster would not have hit the people of Cyprus and in particular the Turkish Cypriots.

How painful and instructive it is that those who refused to negotiate Makarios’ 13-point draft are now flirting with the 5-point Acheson plan of imperialist making whose first article begins with “Enosis”. They flirt in this manner because the Acheson Plan gives the Americans, British and Turkey, i.e. NATO, the right to establish a military base on Cyprus. We will not be in the least bit surprised if the Acheson Plan, whose first article begins with “Enosis”, i.e. the joining of Cyprus with Greece, will be presented to us – a phony moon and star having been placed on it – as a “Turkish thesis” or “Turkish plan”, just like we have seen above with the other imperialist plans, since it contains NATO bases.

“Mr journalist” who collared the 67-year-old Bulgarian grandfather Kadir, saying, “The Greek Cypriot gavurs are slaughtering our Turkish brothers in Cyprus for no reason,” are you unaware of all of these facts? Do you not see that Turkey is on course to become friendless like Franco’s Spain for acting as a lackey to imperialism in the Cyprus question? Have you never, as a journalist, compared Turkey at the time of Ataturk and Turkey’s current international situation? Have you never examined the way that Turkey, which under the leadership of Ataturk opened the banners of national salvation against imperialism for the first time in the Middle East, opposes peoples who are conducting wars of national liberation and the baleful consequences of this?

Mr journalist, if you really love your country and people, leave the Bulgarian Turkish grandfather alone and join the fight of Turkish patriots, progressives and true supporters of Ataturk who are struggling that Turkey may once more take its honourable place on the anti-imperialist front and to open the way to a happy future for the Turkish people. This is the only way you will serve the interests of the Turkish people and the Turkish Cypriots, in whom you purport to show so much interest.

on April 2, 2012 at 19:18 | Reply Ahmet An

Dear Tim Drayton,
As fas as I understand from your posting, which I found through Google by chance, you have read some of my books and translated some parts. Why don’t you write me directly, if I can be of some help in your studies. twilight@kibrisonline.com

Best regards,
Ahmet An

on April 13, 2012 at 07:55 | Reply Tim Drayton

Dear Ahmet,
It is good to hear from somebody who, as your published work shows, is very knowledgable about Cyprus’ recent history.
I have heard it said that Kavazoğlu, while publicly remaining loyal to the AKEL party line until the end, in private had great misgivings about certain policy changes within the party, in particular its support of Enosis, which was alienating Turkish Cypriots. I wonder how sincere you feel that the article published in a Bulgarian magazine that I translated above was; to what extent were these his real views, and to what extent was he simply toeing the party line?
Clearly the split that took place in the trade union movement – particularly the creation of separate Turkish Cypriot trade unions – and on the political left was a victory for the policy of divide and rule and thus played a role in the tragedy that unfolded in Cyprus. While the shift in AKEL’s policy on the national question was probably not the only, or even main, reason for this split, it must have been a contributory factor.
If you have the time to pass on your thoughts about these points, I would be interested to hear them.

 

A REVIEW OF A BOOK IN GERMAN BY PAVLOS TZERMIAS: THE HISTORY OF THE CYPRUS REPUBLIC

Pavlos Tzermias, Geschichte der Republic Zypern (The History of the Cyprus Republic), Francke Verlag, Tübingen 1991, 783 pages (published in Germany)

Pavlos Tzermias has been writing on the Cyprus problem since 1958 and he is well-known for his news reports in the “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” of Switzerland. This voluminous book on the history of Cyprus follows his other two books published in German: New Greek History (1986) and New Greek Literature (1987). His fourth book deals with the life and deeds of Constantine Karamanlis (1992).

The author, who is also a scholar at the University of Freiburg, Switzerland, introduces us an extensive political history of the Cyprus Republic in four sections: Cyprus before the formation of the Republic (pp.1-51), The formation of the Cyprus Republic (pp.52-206), From the state-crisis to the Turkish invasion (pp.207-442) and Cyprus since the tragedy of 1974 (pp.443-645). The rest of the book lists the extensive notes to the main text (pp.647-733), a chronology of Cyprus (pp.735-737) and the reference sources on the history of Cyprus in English, Greek, German, Turkish and French (pp.739-767). A detailed index (pp.769-783) ends up the book, which I recommend everyone, who has interest in the Cyprus problem.

As a Turkish Cypriot, I found this evaluation of the history of Cyprus  Republic very informative and unbiased. Pavlos Tzermias managed to catch the roots of the problem: The conflicting ideologies of enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) and taksim (partition of the island between Turkey and Greece) of the two communities living on the island of Cyprus. He gives us a good example of political cooperation of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for the solution of internal problems in the Legislative Council during the British colonial period of 1924-1927 (p.37). On the other hand, he underlines the grave failure of the Greek Cypriot side, not calculating the opposing Turkish Cypriot factor against the demand of enosis (pp.55, 56, 69, 72, 94)

The author writes: “The enosis movement made its great failure by not dealing extensively and seriously with the parallel right of self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots (p.67). Another German writer, Franz Georg Maier, had already stressed the formula for a workable Cyprus Constitution of 1960: “It could only work if all Cypriots accepted its basic principle, namely the recognition of the Turks as full citizens and not as an ethnic minority.” (Cyprus: From the earliest times to the present day, London 1968, p.162) The aim of the Cypriots in the 1960’s should be the creation of a state of two communities, living together without surrendering their identities.

As Pavlos Tzermias stresses (p.70), the Greek Cypriots has underestimated the influence of the Turkish Cypriot nationalism, which was grown parallel to the Kemalist nationalism in Turkey. Although the Turkish Cypriot sources on the development of this phenomenon were not used in this book, one could see the negative effects of the counter-acting Turkish and Greek nationalisms in Cyprus in the course of the political history.

In fact, I agree with the concluding remarks of the author that an absolute turn from nationalism to Cypriotism is necessary. From my point of view, the way to the final solution of the Cyprus problem can be safeguarded only by a common struggle for building an idea of a common Cyprus state and a common awareness of Cypriotism. The full independence of Cyprus from the influences of the two so-called motherlands, Greece and Turkey, should be reached. The so-called “Sovereign Base Areas” of the former colonial power, Great Britain, should be abolished together with the mainland Turkish and Greek contingents on the island, which support the fanatics on both sides.

The separatist Turkish Cypriot leadership was clever enough to exploit the plans of the Greek Cypriot leadership for the Hellenization of the Cyprus state. Pavlos Tzermias stresses rightly the important point that the Greek Cypriot arrogance for power has created the preconditions for the Turkish Cypriot leadership to implement its partitionist plans (pp.333, 358, 641) Now that the 37% of the territory of the Cyprus Republic is under the occupation of the Turkish Army for the last 20 years, it is high time to find new methods for the survival of the Cyprus Republic through the full implementation of the relevant UN Resolutions. Appropriate conditions should be created for fruitful negotiations for a new federal Cyprus Republic without the threat of the Turkish military power, which continues to trample the Agreement of 1960 and the International Law.

I have also learned from the documents referred in the book that the Republic of Turkey was against the membership of the new Cyprus Republic to the UN (p.226), an annexionist policy, which still hinders the free development of the intercommunal cooperation and friendship. It is true that the Turkish Cypriot leadership started its political marathon with the “Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus” (KATAK) in 1943, but it ended up with the Turkification of the occupied part in 1974 as the Greek Cypriot leadership tried to Hellenize the Cypriot state. The established authority of the Cyprus Republic was able to fight against the EOKA-B, whereas the TMT turned into an illegal statelet under the protection of the Turkish Army. As Pavlos Tsermias writes (p.548), the Cyprus Republic does not want any more to adjust its clock with those in Greece, but the separatist policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership continues.

For a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem, the principles of the international law and basic human rights should be respected. It is left for us to ask why Turkey is still regarded as one of the three guarantor powers of 1960 since she does not respect the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of the Cyprus Republic. Pavlos Tzermias is right to write: “Injustice cannot be answered with injustice!” (pp. 482, 565)

(This review was published in English in the Cyprus Review Journal, Volume 6:2, Fall 1994, pp. 108–109. The Turkish translation of this article was published in Yeni Düzen daily newpaper, 29 August 1994)

 

A comment on an article from the dusty press archives

Below you find an article, published in the Greek-Cypriot daily Neos Anthropos and reproduced a few days later, on 19.3.1952 by the Turkish-Cypriot daily Halkin Sesi. The article is written by G.Ioannidis, K.Koliannis and P.Roussou and its title is “Liberation Struggle of the People of Cyprus - The Turkish Minority”. Here are some excerpts:

"The problem of Turkish minority is the main problem in the anti-imperialist struggle. And the AKEL has to put its policy on these problems with seriousness and certainty... It is obvious that the Turkish-Cypriot worker will not believe in the slogan of enosis with Greece...The Turkish-Cypriots do not believe in the Greek-Cypriots and they don’t trust the Akelists. Because they don’t trust the chauvinism of Great Greece... There has to be a single party of the working people. This can be the National Turkish Branch of this single party (AKEL)... Turkish problem in Cyprus is a special national question within the whole National Question. If the AKEL does not have a complete national policy for the Turkish minority, it will not be able to deal both with the enosis cause and the Greek National Cause..."

***

Has the AKEL developed anything concrete in this respect since 1952 when this article was written or since 1974, when the so-called Minorities Department was closed down because of the de-facto partition? Is it because of this vital failure that we experienced the division of the Cypriot Working Class Forces, in 1958 physically and in 1974 geographically? Since our struggle is common, why are we still not in a position to form a united front of the G/C and T/C working masses?

 

(HADE, bi-communal magazine, Nicosia, No.4, September 2001)

 

 

THE ROOTS OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT: IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN DOCUMENTS

Claud Nicolet, who works for the Swiss Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, published the material of his research at the different archives and libraries throughout the United States and at the Public Records Office in the United Kingdom under the title “United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention” in 2001 in Peleus serial of the Bibliopolis in Germany.

Prof. Dr.Heinz Richter wrote in the Preface of the book the following:

“Claud Nicolet heavily relies on a vast amount of archival material-mostly documents, telephone conversation recordings and oral history interviews- most of which has only opened up for research during the past four years and much of which has been declassified at his own request. As a result, he is not only able to shed some light on heretofore mysterious and hardly-known aspects of America’s role in the Cyprus issue, but also manages to plausibly refute some of the often-heard myths about one or the other event in the area.” (p.16)

Since Nicolet informs us in the “Acknowledgements” that “The Swiss Friends of the United States and the Stodola Fonds have kindly decided to support this project”, we cannot expect from him to accuse the organs of the US for the de-facto partition of this island in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although the writer tells us in the “General Conclusions” that “the war of 1974 ended with U.S. tolerance of de facto partition from the mid-1970s onward, simply because it seemed to guarantee better stability in the region than earlier situations” (p.458), he does not accept the theory that the US had endorsed partition since 1956. (p.445)

There are a enough archival material in Nicolet’s book for those eyes who want to see evidence for the US and British strategic interests on the island of Cyprus. Both countries have used the imperial “divide and rule” policy on the island in the past and present. Therefore we can say that the British still want to keep their sovereign “bases in Cyprus”, instead of “Cyprus as a base” (p.87) and the Americans still are eager to secure the use their communication facilities on the island which operate since 1949. (p.141)

THE US INTEREST SINCE THE 1950’S

We can now start to give some evidence of the US interest in Cyprus and how this country destroyed the fate of the Cypriots with the extracts from the material of the book:

Nicolet reports: “In a special research paper circulating in the regional offices of the Department of State in 1952 the Cypriot nationalists were presented as good guys, stepping up their activities for enosis merely in order to “prevent the communists from capturing the initiative in the movement.” (p.43)

Whereas “the British tried to gain the US support by warning the US of the communist menace in Cyprus in 1954 (p.47) On the other hand, the British managed to involve Turkey through her participation at the London Tripartite Conference “in order to be in a stronger position to counter the increasing anti-colonial sentiments” (p.59) on the island. “Turkey repeated British arguments against Cypriot self-government, that it would give the island into the hands of a “Communist infiltrated population.” (p.61)

It was during this period that Dr.Alexander Melamid, American assistant professor of economic and political geography on the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, New York, presented a paper, titled “The geographical distribution of communities in Cyprus” in the “Geographical Review, Vol.46, No.3, New York 1956, p.355-374, after a field work in Cyprus during the summer of 1954.

It was this same Alexander Melamid of New York University, who published in the Journal of Geograpy, March 1960, Vol.59, Chicago, p.118-123, under the title “Partitioned Cyprus: A class exercise in applied political geography” and discussed the principles of two different partition boundaries for the island.

PROPHECY OR PLANNED PROJECT?

Nicolet writes: “The idea of partitioning Cyprus and of including population transfers has gained attraction in certain circles in the United Kingdom and the United States. Surprisingly, one of the first in the West to come up with the proposal was President Eisenhower, the person who in general proved to be so uninformed regarding the Cyprus dispute, in early June (1956). As a spontaneous idea, during a conversation with Dulles, the president wondered whether it would not be possible to put an end to the conflict by partitioning the island, shifting the Turkish Cypriots to the northern part. It was especially the line of partition he had in mind that proved prophetic for the islands’s future fate.” (p.92)

According to the Americans, “the only solution that seemed to have a chance for long-term success was “a middle ground between partition and enosis in the form of a guaranteed independence according to the American plans of April 1957.” (p.132)

Zorlu has told Dulles in Washington that the Turkish idea of partition did not necessarily need to include a geographical division of the island. It may be enough, the Foreign Minister had said, “that the two communities (...) be given the idea that neither was being governed by the other.” This concept sounded surprisingly compatible with the status of independence of the island.” (p.133)

The Republic of Cyprus was the result of such a diplomacy “towards some form of partition of Cyprus, if not geographically, then at least in term of administration.” (p.133)

UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES

Nicolet states that “EOKA’s resort to an armed struggle took the Americans by surprise.” (p.57) But recent publications of a Greek Cypriot author, Makarios Drushiotis, gives us the information that the EOKA had connections with the US secret services. But Nicolet is not in a position to accept a clearer connection of the EOKA-B with the CIA by writing: “In this regard the unproven allegations or suspicions by authors like Stern and Evriviades that the CIA gave financial support to EOKA-B after February 1974 seem illogical.” (p.412)

For the Greek coup in July 1974 in Cyprus Nicolet writes: “There had not been an American conspiracy with the junta.” (p.422) His following evaluation is interesting: “Rather than bad faith, it has been inadequate handling, bureaucratic breakdowns, misjudgements and, finally, some bad luck, therefore, that had been responsible for the US failure. In all this, it must be remembered that President Makarios still bore the primary misjudging the junta’s determination to get rid of him, his game of brinkmanship for once did not succeed, as he needlessly provoked the Colonels. As Kissinger later wrote: “Makarios had undertaken one-high-wire act too many.” (p.423)

The Turkish Ambassador to the US, Feridun Erkin, pointed out “that it is not international custom to decide questions of sovereignty solely on the basis of majority wishes of the population, but that there are also equally important geographical considerations which must be taken into account.” (p.48)

Turkey still supports this idea and she cannot tolerate an independent Republic of Cyprus in her southern borders. This attitude goes back to the year 1956 when “Vice-President Richard Nixon had been deeply impressed by what he called the Turks’ “positively pathological attitude on the Cyprus problem” during a visit to Ankara”. (p.87)

ONE OF THE EARLY US PLANS FOR CYPRUS

Julius C.Holmes, Special Assistant to Secretary Dulles proposed a ten-year autonomy for Cyprus, while the Governor would remain in his position, though having but a few veto-powers. A plebiscite would take place thereafter, guaranteed by NATO. If people voted for enosis they should receive it, but the British should be guaranteed broad military rights regardless of its outcome. NATO’s area would in the meantime be extended to include Cyprus.” (p.86)

THE IDEA OF THREE GUARANTOR POWERS

“Ever since an Indian UN resolution proposed calling for independence has been brought up in early January (1957), the Greek Government has started to lean towards this option. Parallel to the American pressure on Greece to accept a NATO move, the Greeks thus lobbied the Americas for the idea of independence for Cyprus. However, Foreign Minister Averoff made the fatal mistake of disclosing one idea behind independence in a debate in the Greek Parliament on 11 March, when he stated that it would be a transitional stage towards the realization of enosis. The British quickly noted this, while the Americans added concern about the basic idea of independence, because it would result in an economically weak country and would thus offer a fertile ground for communist influence. In order to disperse such fears Averoff has already on 13 February suggested during a meeting with Dulles a treaty of the type applicable to Austria since 1955 with the U.K., Turkey, “and any other NATO nations” guaranteeing that Cyprus would remain independent and not become a part of Greece.” (p.101)

FIRST US PROPOSAL FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

“As early as 16 April (1957, the acting Secretary) Herter (Deptel) wrote to the embassies and consulate of the region concerned that the “US now believes that either independence within (...) or (...) outside (the) Commonwealth coupled in either case with a treaty preventing enosis are worthy (of) serious consideration...The document as a whole was the first ever instance of US support for a specific solution to the Cyprus conflict.” (p.103)

FIRST NSC MEMORANDUM

Nicolet informs us that the first NSC (National Security Council) memorandum for “US policy toward settlement of the Cyprus dispute” was drafted in Washington on 18 July 1957. (p.104)

“The first bilateral discussions between the British and the Americans about the Cyprus problem took place between 10 and 18 September 1957...(The principal American participant, Walworth Barbour emphasized) that the US would not insist on any specific solution, but that the three parameters originally transmitted in a British oral communication of late July would be a useful point of departure. They were: “a) retention of essential military facilities under British sovereignty; b) protection of (the) island from Communist infiltration; and c) establishment (of) peace and tranquility in (the) island as a whole.” (p.108)

SECRET U.S. CONNECTION WITH THE UNDERGROUND ORGANISATIONS

I do not think that it was just a coincidence that the Turkish Cypriot leadership formed its underground organisation TMT during this period parallel to the EOKA of the Greek Cypriots. This organisation started the provocations against the Greek Cypriots and the progressive Turkish Cypriots which prepared the preconditions for an intercommunal feud. Here are some extracts to this effect:

“The CIA Deputy Director, General Charles P. Cabell, reported on the 353rd NSC meeting that Turkish Cypriots started to attack the British for the first time in an effort to force a partition of the island. (Date of the Editorial Note, 30.1.58) (p.115)

“Turkish-Cypriots, in Deputy Governor Sinclair’s words in “their all-out bid for partition,” staged a bomb explosion outside the Turkish Press Office in Nicosia, setting off violent rioting by the Turkish community.” Band s of Turkish Cypriots invaded the Greek Cypriot quarters of the city and attacked its inhabitants, promting Consul Belcher to fear a “virtual Palestinian situation,” meaning a British walkout from the island, letting the two communities fight its future among themselves. The bomb explosion and ensuing riots was to the Greek side a repetition of the tragedy of September 1955, when the Greeks had been attacked in Izmir and Istanbul. Soon enough Greece again blamed the US for not publicly deploring the Turkish Cypriot action America was drawn into the conflict against her will.”(p.119)

It seems that the author, Claud Nicolet does not have information about the main supporters of the Turkish Cypriot terror organisation TMT, as he makes this kind of assessment. (For a Turkish Cypriot evaluation of the role of the TMT in the Cyprus problem, see, Ahmet An’s “Kıbrıs nereye gidiyor? (Quo vadis Cyprus?), İstanbul 2002, p. 121-171)

Again Nicolet alleges that the author Christopher Hitchens shows no documentary evidence to sudden Turkish reversal of its stance after a substantial American loan was given to Ankara in the wake of the Middle East crisis at the time. (p.123) Whereas he writes a few pages later the following: “To this Dulles has no objection, mentioning that the Turks could hardly reject the idea after having received such a generous US aid package in the summer.” (p.128)

Nicolet’s approach to the valuable book “The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion” (1999) is similar when he writes:  “However, the contention by the two British journalists O’Malley and Craig in their sensationalist -and this not surprisingly popular- book, that “Eisenhover forced Harold Macmillan to give up sovereignty but denied the Cypriots real independence” is an inconceivable distortion of facts.” (p.140)

In another assessment, Nicolet says: “Kadritzke’s claim that AKEL had been proscribed because it was the only party that had organized members of both ethnic communities and thus worked against the British-intended ethnic-religious partition seems much too extreme, as it implies British drive towards partition as a set goal and in bad faith, rather than as a consequence of political turmoil and as their perception as the least of various evils.” (Deep-note, p.143)

This is a mere white-washing of the British-American partitionist policies which hides the provocations for the ethnic conflict and anti-communist hysteria of these two countries during the hey-days of the Cold War era. (See Ahmet An’s two article in the same book about the TMT terror on the progressive Turkish Cypriot trade union members who was against the partition policy of the British colonialists and their collaborator Turkish Cypriot leadership.)

As Nicolet mentions the Greek Cypriot contingency plan-Akritas- in his book (p.179), he avoids to mention anything about the Turkish Cypriot contingency plans which was published in full text with the copy of the Turkish original in Glafkos Clerides’s Memoirs “Cyprus: My deposition” (Vol. I, p.203 - 207 and p.466 - 472).

THE PRIORITIES OF THE AUTHOR AND THE US

Although Claud Nicolet supplies us very valuable declassified US and British material on the secret sides of the Cyprus problem, his main aim is written by himself in the following paragraph:

“It was emphasized earlier in this study that the American policy toward Cyprus from spring 1964 onwards never favored the partition of the island. Popular statements to the contrary by many authors of Greek and Greek Cypriot descent, in addition to some British sources, can be disputed with dozens of written documents from the US Department of State. The truth probably lies more in the direction of the following explanation. What was best for American interests, including their communication facilities, was an island that was peaceful and was removed as a bone of contention. Therefore, the US needed to find any solution that would pacify Cyprus. However, the exact outline of this solution and  what exactly it would entail was secondary, and priorities changed over time.” (p.283)

THE CIA OFFICIALS

The author should not forget that the day-to-day politics is done by the Foreign Ministries of the US, Britain, Turkey, Greece, but the secret deep state organisations like the Gladio do not open their archives in order to supply evidence of their subversive policies. Otherwise Nicolet will be writing this:

“Conspiracy theories by those authors who saw the CIA behind almost everything evil that was happening on the island have only been supported by the weak evidence that extremist  circles in Greece had some good relationship with CIA officials. The author Mayes is more careful. He mentions that many Greek and Greek Cypriots believe that the CIA was involved, but there is no proof for this.” (p.397)

Further in his book, Nicolet writes:

“If some CIA officials had actually encouraged the junta to overthrow the archbishop, they must have done so on a personal basis or owing to CIA sympathies with the junta, rather than an official US instructions. (p.450)

What the Cypriots have been suffering in the last 28 years can be found within the lines of Nicolet’s book. We have to congratulate him for bringing these documents into light out of the archives.  But even if he writes that most of the American documents of the 1970’s were not available at the time of his writing of the book” (p.399), he can accuse some authors that they made unrealistic assessments:

“It is therefore probable that Foley, Scobie, Coufoudakis and Polyviou -together with many other authors of Greek or Greek Cypriot origin- in their assessments chose to agree with Makarios that any proposal that deviated from a central Cypriot administration had to be regarded as “partition”. However, such an interpretation merely seemed to be useful for propaganda and justification purposes rather than being a realistic assessment.” (p.401) 

Although Nicolet criticizes the author Van Coufoudakis as a prominent representative of the theory that the US has endorsed partition since 1956 (p.445), he, himself, makes the following assessment:

“By the time Kissinger again came up with a compromise proposal of giving the Turkish Cypriots 30 percent of the island for autonomous rule in different areas, the Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes had already set an ultimatum, with conditions unacceptable to the Greek side.

After two further days of fighting, the Turkish military occupied the approximately 37 percent of Cyprus that it still holds today, according to a plan that had existed since at least 1964, possibly even since the 1950’s.” (p.452)

“Finally, the war of 1974 ended with US tolerance of de facto partition from the mid-1970’s onward, simply because it seemed to guarantee better stability in the region than the earlier situations. Though partition had turned up time and again in proposals throughout the previous twenty years, it had at no time been endorsed as the favourite US solution.

At no time during those twenty years had the Cypriots themselves been at the center of attention in the American formulations of a solution to their dispute. This was obvious when not even the US representatives in Cyprus were consulted regarding more extreme and pragmatic American plans for peace on the island, which triggered whenever the Cyprus conflict escalated.” (p.458)

What is still on the agenda of the US is the plans of the legal adviser Donald A.Wehmeyer, who in his Working paper, dated 11.12.1963 proposed a “Treaty of Joint Sovereignty of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey.” (p.226)

The same US official prepared an “Outline of Possible Cyprus Settlement” which is very interesting in relation to today’s solution proposals:

“On 24 April (1964) Legal Adviser Wehmeyer added an important ingredient for a solution, which would be more attractive to Turkey. Cyprus, Wehmeyer thought, should be divided into provinces. In addition to the plan above, an illusion of partition or federation could be created by designating certain provinces that were predominantly Turkish, as areas where the Turkish Cypriots would have special rights. This would be achieved by designating a Turkish eparch ad perpetuum to these provinces.” (p.229)

Acheson, however, was fully indulging himself in studying the different proposals that had emerged in Washington throughout the spring (of 1964). In Brands’ words, he was ready to devise a plan “that would eliminate the Cyprus problem by eliminating Cyprus.” A suggestion he was particularly intrigued with was Don Wehmeyer’s scheme of 24 April, providing enosis with an illusion of partition or federation to the Turks by the establishment of certain provinces to be administered by the Turkish Cypriot eparchs, as he cabled to Ball on 8 July (p.257).This was reached later through the US policy of   “controlled intervention” (p.213)

The famous American journalist, Cyrus L.Sulzberger wrote an interesting article in his column in the New York Times of 12 August 1961 and pointed to the “danger that the communists might come to power in Cyprus by an honest, democratic election.” (p.166)

Right after we see the approval of a National Security Action Memorandum 98 (25.9.1961) which stated that the  “US should assume a more active role in Cyprus than in the past and desires that the program to this end be pushed vigorously including overt and, where feasible, covert measures to contain and reduce communist strength.” (p.166 - 167)

Who knows what kind of action programs were used after the de facto partition of Cyprus in 1974 to keep the division of the two communities of the island. We can only read between the lines of certain books like “1989 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs” which writes under the “Cyprus” section the following:

“If the north and south of Cyprus were reunited in a future “federated Cyprus” the combined electoral strength of the Greek and Turkish communists could produce a majority of the votes in any presidential election under such a novel government.” (p.530)

(Turkish translation of this article was published in the weekly newspaper Yeni Çağ, on 21, 28 March and 4 April 2003 in Nicosia.)

 

REVIEW OF TWO BOOKS BY KIZILYUREK

 1.      Kızılyürek, Niyazi, Paşalar, Papazlar (Pashas and Priests), Nicosia 1988, 130 pages (in Turkish language)

The first thing to say about this book, written by Niyazi Kızılyürek, is that it does not have a unity of the subjects, dealt in the book. It is rather a compilation of 14 articles on different subjects. Although the title of the book is “Pashas and the Priests”, there is no account of their activities in the book. It seems that the title is selected for the sake of commercial attraction. The book is introduced as the first of a serial, called “Cyprus Notebooks”, as if others will follow. Unfortunately the wish of the writer to bring a new viewpoint to the history of Cyprus is not being realized in the 14 articles, published for the first time in this book. There is no chronological order of the articles, no systematic either. The introduction of the subjects is superficial and they have no connection between them. There are a lot of mistakes about the references of the books and the articles, on which the allegations of the writer are made. Moreover, the bibliography given after the 4th article is very poor for a researcher, who made his graduate and post-graduate studies in Germany. There is no mention of the place and the years of the publications of the reference material. There are also deficiencies in the footnotes within the text. There was also no need to imitate the writing style of the Turkish researcher, Yalçın Küçük. Although it is stated in the inner pages that the typesetting of the book was made in London, there is no mention of where the book was printed (in fact in Nicosia as I heard).

Özker Özgür, the Chairman of the Republican Turkish Party, wrote an article in Yeni Düzen newspaper about this book and said: “The loyalty to the Marxist method of criticism and interrogation is observed in the book. But this did not cause any dryness or boredom.” Thus, we learn from Mr. Özgür that the Marxist method can be dry and boring! Was Mr. Özgür not the one, who found out his reading of Marx’s “Capital” boring and turned to read Bülent Ecevit’s “This order has to be changed”, when he wrote years ago in his column in Halkın Sesi?

Why does Kızılyürek find it necessary to write the following sentence in the preface of the book: “The method of criticism and interrogation of this book serial is Marxist”? We could not find out the answer in the book. After we read the whole 14 articles, it becomes clear, how superficial the researcher understood the Marxist method.

Although in the preface it is written that there are 14 articles in the book, they are not numbered, but put in disorder. The first article is a speech made by Kızılyürek at a panel, organized in London on the “Cypriot Turkish Identity in the Literature”. The writer uses the term of “Cyprus upper-class”, which is not used in Turkish and it is indefinite. It seems that he preferred to use this term, translated from English, after looking at the underdeveloped character of the Turkish Cypriot commercial bourgeosie, instead of defining it with the classical term “bourgeosie”. But it is not appropriate, because it is well-known that the Turkish Cypriot notables have turned from tradesmanship and land-ownership into commercial bourgeosie. Its dependent and underdeveloped structure should not stop the writer to call them with this correct name. Kızılyürek writes the following: “Undoubtedly, there is a collaborationist-traditional section in every colony. But on the opposite side, there are local, national classes, which are pioneers of the national liberation movement, in other words, pioneers of becoming a nation and of modernization. This is failing in the Turkish Cypriot community.”

The writer alleges that he uses the Marxist methodology, but it is a pity that he prefers to take the easy way by saying “No, there isn’t”, when he looks and he does not see what he is looking for. Moreover, this proves that he did not make the necessary research of the socio-economic and political structure of the Turkish Cypriot community, which has a population of 100,000. As he could not use the Marxist thought in a creative way, he writes in short. “The political ideology and the ideological identity of the Turkish Cypriot upper-class formed itself as Sir plus Pasha plus Turan (Panturkism)” (p.20). He refers to the Sirs, OK. But where are the Pashas? He did not see it necessary to refer to the Ottoman society structure, which lasted 300 years and what did it leave as a legacy to the Turkish Cypriot community. He did not deal even with the rebellions of the people against the Pashas and the Priests during the Ottoman period. He writes that the identity of “Sir plus Pasha” got ripe in the 1940’s, without giving convincing and detailed information. Whereas in those years, there were differentiations, which started between the “upper-class” and the “lower-class” of the Turkish Cypriots in the standard of organization and difference of ideological views and the identity of today’s Turkish Cypriot leadership was about to be formed. The internal and external factors towards

becoming a national Turkish community out of a Muslim community started to be influential just at the end of 1940’s.

It seems that Kızılyürek either has insufficient information about the historical formation of the Turkish Cypriot bourgeosie, let alone about the struggle of the Turkish Cypriot working classes or he could not get what he wanted out of English and German reference books he read! Otherwise he would not write the following evaluation: “The reason of this crisis of the Turkish Cypriot community originates from the fact that it does not have a history of his own.” (p.24) If we say it with the writer’s terminology, contrary to his allegation (p.24), both the upper- and the lower-classes of Cyprus have made their own histories. What is important is that, one has not to alienate himself from these histories and has to regard the internal and external factors and that one has to make a scientific historical research. Such a work is done already in the reference books the writer has given.

What are being told in the section titled “Greek Cypriot bourgeosie, which is class-impotent” shows on the contrary, how potent the Greek Cypriot bourgeosie has been. That is why the judgements like are overturned realities: “The Greek Cypriot bourgeois class refrained from making a bourgeois revolution in Cyprus by uniting the Cyprus working class and why it does not want to share the power with the working class.” (p.30-31) Because it was the working class organizations themselves, which caused the historical division of the working class of Cyprus by grasping the enosis ideology of the Greek Cypriot bourgeosie. The explanation of the hegemony of the real pashas of today originates from this historical mistake.

(For the Turkish original article, see Araştırma kitaplarımız bilimsellikten uzak, Kıbrıs Postası, 18-19-21 June 1988)

 

2.      Kızılyürek, Niyazi, Ulus Ötesi Kıbrıs (Cyprus Beyond Nation), Nicosia 1993, 78 pages (in Turkish language), 88 pages in Greek language (İ Kipros peran tu ethnus)

Niyazi Kızılyürek introduced his book “Beyond Nation” to the readers in both Turkish and Greek languages in the same volume with a preface, where he writes: “Since many years, let there be a piece of scientific movement finally. With the hope of having more books published in two languages.” But there have been several scientific publications already about the influences of the Greek and Turkish nationalism on Cyprus problem, written by Greek Cypriots (e.g. Zenon Stavrinides, Michael Attalides and others) and by Turkish Cypriots (Notes on the development of a Cypriot consciousness, a serial by Kemal Cankat, published in the weekly Demokrat newspaper in 1989). Maybe these studies could not reach to a lot of readers, but Mr. Kızılyürek, as a researcher, should have been aware of them.

The author, who seems to be under the influence of Murat Belge, a Turkish writer, and especially of his book “In which part of the world is Turkey?”, tries to adapt Belge’s view, which is “to isolate the existing states from nationalism”. But he makes important mistakes by bringing wrong comments on the history of Cyprus. For example, he writes: “There was never a political or ideological initiative for co-existence” (p.13). He overlooks the activities of the Communist Party of Cyprus between the years 1921 and 1931 and the political activities of the Turkish Cypriot intellectuals, who got together around the weekly newspaper “Cumhuriyet” of the years “1960-1962.

The author defines the founding of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 as a “revolution” and the events of the 1974 as a “counter-revolution”. These examples show us that he is not realist, but he has a schematic approach. He does not refer to the fact that the roots of “competitive nationalism” (in his own words) grasped the Cypriot soil just in this period, when the British colonial administration staged the “1931 rebellion”, in order to stop the common political and ideological activities of both communities. (For a detailed explanation, please look at my serial: “The formation of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, Yeni Çağ weekly, 8 March 1993 – 28 November 1994 – 85 instalments)

How can one create a “Cyprus Beyond Nation” without referring to the importance of the “common class consciousness” in the development of the “us” feeing, without referring to the influence of Greece and Turkey, each being a NATO country, of the influence of Anglo-American imperialism on the Cyprus problem and on the Cypriots themselves?

Kızılyürek writes: “Even in the meetings of the most advanced sections of both communities, one feels the existence of doubt clouds”, which shows from which point of approach he looks at the problem!

We can conclude by saying that Mr. Kızılyürek need to learn more about the science of research and a sense of scientific judgement, before he publishes books, which can cause a lot of unquietness for himself and for those, who wage a struggle for the friendship of the two communities in Cyprus.

(For the original Turkish article, see Yeni Düzen, 30 January 1994)