SECRET/EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM FOR KISSINGER (August 14,1974)

SECRET/EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM FOR KISSINGER FROM THE COUNSELOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON: “...privately assure Turks we will get them a solution involving one third of the island, within some kind of federal arrangement.”

A shocking August 14, 1974, “SECRET/EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY” from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the U.S. State Department, to Secretary Henry Kissinger became public a few weeks ago. It was published in the Cyprus Weekly of August 10, 2007.

The text of this important document follows:

“THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 14, 1974
SECRET/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY
FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Cyprus Actions

You wanted some brief ideas on what we do next.

Nothing I can think of will stop the Turks now from trying to secure by force what they demanded in their ultimata. In fact, as has always been true, the only conceivable modus vivendi will have to rest on a de facto division of the island, whatever the form.

If the Turks move fast and can then be gotten to stand down, it may pre-empt Greek counteraction and then give us a chance to try for a deal. (It may also save Karamanlis).

While the Soviets can serve as a bogey, we must keep them at arms length. They cannot become the arbiter between US allies. Their interests differ drastically from ours: we want a modus vivendi between Greece and Turkey, they want a non-aligned Cyprus, preferably with Greece or Turkey or both disaffected from NATO.

Thus, we should

•  urgently try to contain Greek reaction; 24 hours at a time;
•  bluntly tell the Turks they must stop, today, tomorrow at the latest;
•  warn the Turks that Greece is rapidly moving leftward;
•  send high-level US man to Athens to exert continuing direct influence on Karamanlis;
•  assuming the Turks quickly take Famagusta, privately assure Turks we will get them a solution  involving one third of the island, within some kind of federal arrangement;
•  assure Greeks we will contain Turk demands and allow no additional enclaves, etc.

You should not get involved directly till the fighting stops; then you must since there is no alternative and only we have the clout.

I do not think Brussels/NATO is the place to use when the time comes. The Greeks are probably too sore at NATO and the vehicle of a ministerial meeting is awkward. Anyway, you need Ecevit and Karamanlis.

London may be unacceptable to the Turks because of Callaghan’s blast at them.
You should not shuttle.”