Claud Nicolet, who works for the Swiss Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, published the material of his research at the different archives and libraries throughout the United States and at the Public Records Office in the United Kingdom under the title “United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention” in 2001 in Peleus serial of the Bibliopolis in Germany.
Prof. Dr.Heinz Richter wrote in the Preface of the
book the following:
“Claud Nicolet heavily relies on a vast amount of
archival material-mostly documents, telephone conversation recordings and oral
history interviews- most of which has only opened up for research during the
past four years and much of which has been declassified at his own request. As
a result, he is not only able to shed some light on heretofore mysterious and
hardly-known aspects of America’s role in the Cyprus issue, but also manages to
plausibly refute some of the often-heard myths about one or the other event in
the area.” (p.16)
Since Nicolet informs us in the “Acknowledgements”
that “The Swiss Friends of the United States and the Stodola Fonds have kindly
decided to support this project”, we cannot expect from him to accuse the
organs of the US for the de-facto partition of this island in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Although the writer tells us in the “General Conclusions” that
“the war of 1974 ended with U.S. tolerance of de facto partition from the mid-1970s
onward, simply because it seemed to guarantee better stability in the region
than earlier situations” (p.458), he does not accept the theory that the US had
endorsed partition since 1956. (p.445)
There are a enough archival material in Nicolet’s book
for those eyes who want to see evidence for the US and British strategic
interests on the island of Cyprus. Both countries have used the imperial
“divide and rule” policy on the island in the past and present. Therefore we
can say that the British still want to keep their sovereign “bases in Cyprus”,
instead of “Cyprus as a base” (p.87) and the Americans still are eager to
secure the use their communication facilities on the island which operate since
1949. (p.141)
THE US INTEREST SINCE THE 1950’S
We can now start to give some evidence of the US
interest in Cyprus and how this country destroyed the fate of the Cypriots with
the extracts from the material of the book:
Nicolet reports: “In a special research paper
circulating in the regional offices of the Department of State in 1952 the
Cypriot nationalists were presented as good guys, stepping up their activities
for enosis merely in order to “prevent the communists from capturing the
initiative in the movement.” (p.43)
Whereas “the
British tried to gain the US support by warning the US of the communist menace
in Cyprus in 1954 (p.47) On the other hand, the British managed to involve
Turkey through her participation at the London Tripartite Conference “in order
to be in a stronger position to counter the increasing anti-colonial
sentiments” (p.59) on the island. “Turkey repeated British arguments against
Cypriot self-government, that it would give the island into the hands of a
“Communist infiltrated population.” (p.61)
It was during this
period that Dr.Alexander Melamid, American assistant professor of economic and
political geography on the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social
Research, New York, presented a paper, titled “The geographical distribution of
communities in Cyprus” in the “Geographical Review, Vol.46, No.3, New York
1956, p.355-374, after a field work in Cyprus during the summer of 1954.
It was this same
Alexander Melamid of New York University, who published in the Journal of
Geograpy, March 1960, Vol.59, Chicago, p.118-123, under the title “Partitioned
Cyprus: A class exercise in applied political geography” and discussed the
principles of two different partition boundaries for the island.
PROPHECY OR
PLANNED PROJECT?
Nicolet writes:
“The idea of partitioning Cyprus and of including population transfers has
gained attraction in certain circles in the United Kingdom and the United
States. Surprisingly, one of the first in the West to come up with the proposal
was President Eisenhower, the person who in general proved to be so uninformed
regarding the Cyprus dispute, in early June (1956). As a spontaneous idea,
during a conversation with Dulles, the president wondered whether it would not
be possible to put an end to the conflict by partitioning the island, shifting
the Turkish Cypriots to the northern part. It
was especially the line of partition he had in mind that proved prophetic for
the islands’s future fate.” (p.92)
According to the
Americans, “the only solution that seemed to have a chance for long-term
success was “a middle ground between partition and enosis in the form of a
guaranteed independence according to the American plans of April 1957.” (p.132)
Zorlu has told
Dulles in Washington that the Turkish idea of partition did not necessarily
need to include a geographical division of the island. It may be enough, the
Foreign Minister had said, “that the two communities (...) be given the idea
that neither was being governed by the other.” This concept sounded
surprisingly compatible with the status of independence of the island.” (p.133)
The Republic of
Cyprus was the result of such a diplomacy “towards some form of partition of
Cyprus, if not geographically, then at least in term of administration.”
(p.133)
UNDERGROUND
ACTIVITIES
Nicolet states
that “EOKA’s resort to an armed struggle took the Americans by surprise.”
(p.57) But recent publications of a Greek Cypriot author, Makarios Drushiotis,
gives us the information that the EOKA had connections with the US secret
services. But Nicolet is not in a position to accept a clearer connection of
the EOKA-B with the CIA by writing: “In this regard the unproven allegations or
suspicions by authors like Stern and Evriviades that the CIA gave financial
support to EOKA-B after February 1974 seem illogical.” (p.412)
For the Greek coup
in July 1974 in Cyprus Nicolet writes: “There had not been an American
conspiracy with the junta.” (p.422) His following evaluation is interesting:
“Rather than bad faith, it has been inadequate handling, bureaucratic
breakdowns, misjudgements and, finally, some bad luck, therefore, that had been
responsible for the US failure. In all this, it must be remembered that
President Makarios still bore the primary misjudging the junta’s determination
to get rid of him, his game of brinkmanship for once did not succeed, as he
needlessly provoked the Colonels. As Kissinger later wrote: “Makarios had
undertaken one-high-wire act too many.” (p.423)
The Turkish
Ambassador to the US, Feridun Erkin, pointed out “that it is not international
custom to decide questions of sovereignty solely on the basis of majority
wishes of the population, but that there are also equally important
geographical considerations which must be taken into account.” (p.48)
Turkey still
supports this idea and she cannot tolerate an independent Republic of Cyprus in
her southern borders. This attitude goes back to the year 1956 when
“Vice-President Richard Nixon had been deeply impressed by what he called the
Turks’ “positively pathological attitude on the Cyprus problem” during a visit
to Ankara”. (p.87)
ONE OF THE EARLY
US PLANS FOR CYPRUS
Julius C.Holmes,
Special Assistant to Secretary Dulles proposed a ten-year autonomy for Cyprus,
while the Governor would remain in his position, though having but a few
veto-powers. A plebiscite would take place thereafter, guaranteed by NATO. If
people voted for enosis they should receive it, but the British should be
guaranteed broad military rights regardless of its outcome. NATO’s area would
in the meantime be extended to include Cyprus.” (p.86)
THE IDEA OF THREE
GUARANTOR POWERS
“Ever since an
Indian UN resolution proposed calling for independence has been brought up in
early January (1957), the Greek Government has started to lean towards this
option. Parallel to the American pressure on Greece to accept a NATO move, the
Greeks thus lobbied the Americas for the idea of independence for Cyprus.
However, Foreign Minister Averoff made the fatal mistake of disclosing one idea
behind independence in a debate in the Greek Parliament on 11 March, when he stated
that it would be a transitional stage towards the realization of enosis. The
British quickly noted this, while the Americans added concern about the basic
idea of independence, because it would result in an economically weak country
and would thus offer a fertile ground for communist influence. In order to
disperse such fears Averoff has already on 13 February suggested during a
meeting with Dulles a treaty of the type applicable to Austria since 1955 with
the U.K., Turkey, “and any other NATO nations” guaranteeing that Cyprus would
remain independent and not become a part of Greece.” (p.101)
FIRST US PROPOSAL
FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
“As early as 16
April (1957, the acting Secretary) Herter (Deptel) wrote to the embassies and
consulate of the region concerned that the “US now believes that either
independence within (...) or (...) outside (the) Commonwealth coupled in either
case with a treaty preventing enosis are worthy (of) serious
consideration...The document as a whole was the first ever instance of US
support for a specific solution to the Cyprus conflict.” (p.103)
FIRST NSC
MEMORANDUM
Nicolet informs us
that the first NSC (National Security Council) memorandum for “US policy toward
settlement of the Cyprus dispute” was drafted in Washington on 18 July 1957.
(p.104)
“The first
bilateral discussions between the British and the Americans about the Cyprus
problem took place between 10 and 18 September 1957...(The principal American
participant, Walworth Barbour emphasized) that the US would not insist on any
specific solution, but that the three parameters originally transmitted in a
British oral communication of late July would be a useful point of departure.
They were: “a) retention of essential military facilities under British sovereignty;
b) protection of (the) island from Communist infiltration; and c) establishment
(of) peace and tranquility in (the) island as a whole.” (p.108)
SECRET U.S.
CONNECTION WITH THE UNDERGROUND ORGANISATIONS
I do not think
that it was just a coincidence that the Turkish Cypriot leadership formed its
underground organisation TMT during this period parallel to the EOKA of the
Greek Cypriots. This organisation started the provocations against the Greek
Cypriots and the progressive Turkish Cypriots which prepared the preconditions
for an intercommunal feud. Here are some extracts to this effect:
“The CIA Deputy
Director, General Charles P. Cabell, reported on the 353rd NSC meeting that
Turkish Cypriots started to attack the British for the first time in an effort
to force a partition of the island. (Date of the Editorial Note, 30.1.58)
(p.115)
“Turkish-Cypriots,
in Deputy Governor Sinclair’s words in “their all-out bid for partition,”
staged a bomb explosion outside the Turkish Press Office in Nicosia, setting off
violent rioting by the Turkish community.” Band s of Turkish Cypriots invaded
the Greek Cypriot quarters of the city and attacked its inhabitants, promting
Consul Belcher to fear a “virtual Palestinian situation,” meaning a British
walkout from the island, letting the two communities fight its future among
themselves. The bomb explosion and ensuing riots was to the Greek side a
repetition of the tragedy of September 1955, when the Greeks had been attacked
in Izmir and Istanbul. Soon enough Greece again blamed the US for not publicly
deploring the Turkish Cypriot action America was drawn into the conflict
against her will.”(p.119)
It seems that the
author, Claud Nicolet does not have information about the main supporters of
the Turkish Cypriot terror organisation TMT, as he makes this kind of
assessment. (For a Turkish Cypriot evaluation of the role of the TMT in the Cyprus
problem, see, Ahmet An’s “Kıbrıs nereye gidiyor? (Quo vadis Cyprus?), İstanbul
2002, p. 121-171)
Again Nicolet
alleges that the author Christopher Hitchens shows no documentary evidence to
sudden Turkish reversal of its stance after a substantial American loan was
given to Ankara in the wake of the Middle East crisis at the time. (p.123)
Whereas he writes a few pages later the following: “To this Dulles has no
objection, mentioning that the Turks could hardly reject the idea after having
received such a generous US aid package in the summer.” (p.128)
Nicolet’s approach
to the valuable book “The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish
Invasion” (1999) is similar when he writes:
“However, the contention by the two British journalists O’Malley and Craig
in their sensationalist -and this not surprisingly popular- book, that
“Eisenhover forced Harold Macmillan to give up sovereignty but denied the
Cypriots real independence” is an inconceivable distortion of facts.” (p.140)
In another
assessment, Nicolet says: “Kadritzke’s claim that AKEL had been proscribed
because it was the only party that had organized members of both ethnic
communities and thus worked against the British-intended ethnic-religious
partition seems much too extreme, as it implies British drive towards partition
as a set goal and in bad faith, rather than as a consequence of political
turmoil and as their perception as the least of various evils.” (Deep-note,
p.143)
This is a mere
white-washing of the British-American partitionist policies which hides the
provocations for the ethnic conflict and anti-communist hysteria of these two
countries during the hey-days of the Cold War era. (See Ahmet An’s two article
in the same book about the TMT terror on the progressive Turkish Cypriot trade union
members who was against the partition policy of the British colonialists and
their collaborator Turkish Cypriot leadership.)
As Nicolet
mentions the Greek Cypriot contingency plan-Akritas- in his book (p.179), he
avoids to mention anything about the Turkish Cypriot contingency plans which
was published in full text with the copy of the Turkish original in Glafkos
Clerides’s Memoirs “Cyprus: My deposition” (Vol. I, p.203 - 207 and p.466 - 472).
THE PRIORITIES OF
THE AUTHOR AND THE US
Although Claud Nicolet
supplies us very valuable declassified US and British material on the secret
sides of the Cyprus problem, his main aim is written by himself in the
following paragraph:
“It was emphasized
earlier in this study that the American policy toward Cyprus from spring 1964
onwards never favored the partition of the island. Popular statements to the
contrary by many authors of Greek and Greek Cypriot descent, in addition to
some British sources, can be disputed with dozens of written documents from the
US Department of State. The truth probably lies more in the direction of the
following explanation. What was best for American interests, including their
communication facilities, was an island that was peaceful and was removed as a
bone of contention. Therefore, the US needed to find any solution that would
pacify Cyprus. However, the exact outline of this solution and what exactly it would entail was secondary,
and priorities changed over time.” (p.283)
THE CIA OFFICIALS
The author should
not forget that the day-to-day politics is done by the Foreign Ministries of
the US, Britain, Turkey, Greece, but the secret deep state organisations like
the Gladio do not open their archives in order to supply evidence of their
subversive policies. Otherwise Nicolet will be writing this:
“Conspiracy
theories by those authors who saw the CIA behind almost everything evil that
was happening on the island have only been supported by the weak evidence that
extremist circles in Greece had some
good relationship with CIA officials. The author Mayes is more careful. He
mentions that many Greek and Greek Cypriots believe that the CIA was involved,
but there is no proof for this.” (p.397)
Further in his
book, Nicolet writes:
“If some CIA
officials had actually encouraged the junta to overthrow the archbishop, they
must have done so on a personal basis or owing to CIA sympathies with the
junta, rather than an official US instructions. (p.450)
What the Cypriots
have been suffering in the last 28 years can be found within the lines of
Nicolet’s book. We have to congratulate him for bringing these documents into
light out of the archives. But even if
he writes that most of the American documents of the 1970’s were not available
at the time of his writing of the book” (p.399), he can accuse some authors
that they made unrealistic assessments:
“It is therefore
probable that Foley, Scobie, Coufoudakis and Polyviou -together with many other
authors of Greek or Greek Cypriot origin- in their assessments chose to agree
with Makarios that any proposal that deviated from a central Cypriot administration
had to be regarded as “partition”. However, such an interpretation merely
seemed to be useful for propaganda and justification purposes rather than being
a realistic assessment.” (p.401)
Although Nicolet
criticizes the author Van Coufoudakis as a prominent representative of the
theory that the US has endorsed partition since 1956 (p.445), he, himself,
makes the following assessment:
“By the time
Kissinger again came up with a compromise proposal of giving the Turkish
Cypriots 30 percent of the island for autonomous rule in different areas, the
Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes had already set an ultimatum, with conditions
unacceptable to the Greek side.
After two further
days of fighting, the Turkish military occupied the approximately 37 percent of
Cyprus that it still holds today, according to a plan that had existed since at
least 1964, possibly even since the 1950’s.” (p.452)
“Finally, the war
of 1974 ended with US tolerance of de facto partition from the mid-1970’s
onward, simply because it seemed to guarantee better stability in the region
than the earlier situations. Though partition had turned up time and again in
proposals throughout the previous twenty years, it had at no time been endorsed
as the favourite US solution.
At no time during
those twenty years had the Cypriots themselves been at the center of attention
in the American formulations of a solution to their dispute. This was obvious
when not even the US representatives in Cyprus were consulted regarding more
extreme and pragmatic American plans for peace on the island, which triggered
whenever the Cyprus conflict escalated.” (p.458)
What is still on
the agenda of the US is the plans of the legal adviser Donald A.Wehmeyer, who
in his Working paper, dated 11.12.1963 proposed a “Treaty of Joint Sovereignty
of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey.” (p.226)
The same US
official prepared an “Outline of Possible Cyprus Settlement” which is very
interesting in relation to today’s solution proposals:
“On 24 April
(1964) Legal Adviser Wehmeyer added an important ingredient for a solution,
which would be more attractive to Turkey. Cyprus,
Wehmeyer thought, should be divided into provinces. In addition to the plan
above, an illusion of partition or federation could be created by designating
certain provinces that were predominantly Turkish, as areas where the Turkish
Cypriots would have special rights. This would be achieved by designating a
Turkish eparch ad perpetuum to these provinces.” (p.229)
Acheson, however,
was fully indulging himself in studying the different proposals that had
emerged in Washington throughout the spring (of 1964). In Brands’ words, he was
ready to devise a plan “that would eliminate the Cyprus problem by eliminating
Cyprus.” A suggestion he was particularly intrigued with was Don Wehmeyer’s
scheme of 24 April, providing enosis with an illusion of partition or
federation to the Turks by the establishment of certain provinces to be
administered by the Turkish Cypriot eparchs, as he cabled to Ball on 8 July
(p.257).This was reached later through the US policy of “controlled intervention” (p.213)
The famous
American journalist, Cyrus L.Sulzberger wrote an interesting article in his
column in the New York Times of 12 August 1961 and pointed to the “danger that
the communists might come to power in Cyprus by an honest, democratic
election.” (p.166)
Right after we see
the approval of a National Security Action Memorandum 98 (25.9.1961) which
stated that the “US should assume a more
active role in Cyprus than in the past and desires that the program to this end
be pushed vigorously including overt and, where feasible, covert measures to
contain and reduce communist strength.” (p.166 - 167)
Who knows what
kind of action programs were used after the de facto partition of Cyprus in
1974 to keep the division of the two communities of the island. We can only
read between the lines of certain books like “1989 Yearbook on International
Communist Affairs” which writes under the “Cyprus” section the following:
“If the north and
south of Cyprus were reunited in a future “federated Cyprus” the combined
electoral strength of the Greek and Turkish communists could produce a majority
of the votes in any presidential election under such a novel government.”
(p.530)
(Turkish
translation of this article was published in the weekly newspaper Yeni Çağ, on
21, 28 March and 4 April 2003 in Nicosia.)
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