A comment on an article from the dusty press archives

Below you find an article, published in the Greek-Cypriot daily Neos Anthropos and reproduced a few days later, on 19.3.1952 by the Turkish-Cypriot daily Halkin Sesi. The article is written by G.Ioannidis, K.Koliannis and P.Roussou and its title is “Liberation Struggle of the People of Cyprus - The Turkish Minority”. Here are some excerpts:

"The problem of Turkish minority is the main problem in the anti-imperialist struggle. And the AKEL has to put its policy on these problems with seriousness and certainty... It is obvious that the Turkish-Cypriot worker will not believe in the slogan of enosis with Greece...The Turkish-Cypriots do not believe in the Greek-Cypriots and they don’t trust the Akelists. Because they don’t trust the chauvinism of Great Greece... There has to be a single party of the working people. This can be the National Turkish Branch of this single party (AKEL)... Turkish problem in Cyprus is a special national question within the whole National Question. If the AKEL does not have a complete national policy for the Turkish minority, it will not be able to deal both with the enosis cause and the Greek National Cause..."

***

Has the AKEL developed anything concrete in this respect since 1952 when this article was written or since 1974, when the so-called Minorities Department was closed down because of the de-facto partition? Is it because of this vital failure that we experienced the division of the Cypriot Working Class Forces, in 1958 physically and in 1974 geographically? Since our struggle is common, why are we still not in a position to form a united front of the G/C and T/C working masses?

 

(HADE, bi-communal magazine, Nicosia, No.4, September 2001)

 

 

THE ROOTS OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT: IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN DOCUMENTS

Claud Nicolet, who works for the Swiss Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, published the material of his research at the different archives and libraries throughout the United States and at the Public Records Office in the United Kingdom under the title “United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention” in 2001 in Peleus serial of the Bibliopolis in Germany.

Prof. Dr.Heinz Richter wrote in the Preface of the book the following:

“Claud Nicolet heavily relies on a vast amount of archival material-mostly documents, telephone conversation recordings and oral history interviews- most of which has only opened up for research during the past four years and much of which has been declassified at his own request. As a result, he is not only able to shed some light on heretofore mysterious and hardly-known aspects of America’s role in the Cyprus issue, but also manages to plausibly refute some of the often-heard myths about one or the other event in the area.” (p.16)

Since Nicolet informs us in the “Acknowledgements” that “The Swiss Friends of the United States and the Stodola Fonds have kindly decided to support this project”, we cannot expect from him to accuse the organs of the US for the de-facto partition of this island in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although the writer tells us in the “General Conclusions” that “the war of 1974 ended with U.S. tolerance of de facto partition from the mid-1970s onward, simply because it seemed to guarantee better stability in the region than earlier situations” (p.458), he does not accept the theory that the US had endorsed partition since 1956. (p.445)

There are a enough archival material in Nicolet’s book for those eyes who want to see evidence for the US and British strategic interests on the island of Cyprus. Both countries have used the imperial “divide and rule” policy on the island in the past and present. Therefore we can say that the British still want to keep their sovereign “bases in Cyprus”, instead of “Cyprus as a base” (p.87) and the Americans still are eager to secure the use their communication facilities on the island which operate since 1949. (p.141)

THE US INTEREST SINCE THE 1950’S

We can now start to give some evidence of the US interest in Cyprus and how this country destroyed the fate of the Cypriots with the extracts from the material of the book:

Nicolet reports: “In a special research paper circulating in the regional offices of the Department of State in 1952 the Cypriot nationalists were presented as good guys, stepping up their activities for enosis merely in order to “prevent the communists from capturing the initiative in the movement.” (p.43)

Whereas “the British tried to gain the US support by warning the US of the communist menace in Cyprus in 1954 (p.47) On the other hand, the British managed to involve Turkey through her participation at the London Tripartite Conference “in order to be in a stronger position to counter the increasing anti-colonial sentiments” (p.59) on the island. “Turkey repeated British arguments against Cypriot self-government, that it would give the island into the hands of a “Communist infiltrated population.” (p.61)

It was during this period that Dr.Alexander Melamid, American assistant professor of economic and political geography on the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, New York, presented a paper, titled “The geographical distribution of communities in Cyprus” in the “Geographical Review, Vol.46, No.3, New York 1956, p.355-374, after a field work in Cyprus during the summer of 1954.

It was this same Alexander Melamid of New York University, who published in the Journal of Geograpy, March 1960, Vol.59, Chicago, p.118-123, under the title “Partitioned Cyprus: A class exercise in applied political geography” and discussed the principles of two different partition boundaries for the island.

PROPHECY OR PLANNED PROJECT?

Nicolet writes: “The idea of partitioning Cyprus and of including population transfers has gained attraction in certain circles in the United Kingdom and the United States. Surprisingly, one of the first in the West to come up with the proposal was President Eisenhower, the person who in general proved to be so uninformed regarding the Cyprus dispute, in early June (1956). As a spontaneous idea, during a conversation with Dulles, the president wondered whether it would not be possible to put an end to the conflict by partitioning the island, shifting the Turkish Cypriots to the northern part. It was especially the line of partition he had in mind that proved prophetic for the islands’s future fate.” (p.92)

According to the Americans, “the only solution that seemed to have a chance for long-term success was “a middle ground between partition and enosis in the form of a guaranteed independence according to the American plans of April 1957.” (p.132)

Zorlu has told Dulles in Washington that the Turkish idea of partition did not necessarily need to include a geographical division of the island. It may be enough, the Foreign Minister had said, “that the two communities (...) be given the idea that neither was being governed by the other.” This concept sounded surprisingly compatible with the status of independence of the island.” (p.133)

The Republic of Cyprus was the result of such a diplomacy “towards some form of partition of Cyprus, if not geographically, then at least in term of administration.” (p.133)

UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES

Nicolet states that “EOKA’s resort to an armed struggle took the Americans by surprise.” (p.57) But recent publications of a Greek Cypriot author, Makarios Drushiotis, gives us the information that the EOKA had connections with the US secret services. But Nicolet is not in a position to accept a clearer connection of the EOKA-B with the CIA by writing: “In this regard the unproven allegations or suspicions by authors like Stern and Evriviades that the CIA gave financial support to EOKA-B after February 1974 seem illogical.” (p.412)

For the Greek coup in July 1974 in Cyprus Nicolet writes: “There had not been an American conspiracy with the junta.” (p.422) His following evaluation is interesting: “Rather than bad faith, it has been inadequate handling, bureaucratic breakdowns, misjudgements and, finally, some bad luck, therefore, that had been responsible for the US failure. In all this, it must be remembered that President Makarios still bore the primary misjudging the junta’s determination to get rid of him, his game of brinkmanship for once did not succeed, as he needlessly provoked the Colonels. As Kissinger later wrote: “Makarios had undertaken one-high-wire act too many.” (p.423)

The Turkish Ambassador to the US, Feridun Erkin, pointed out “that it is not international custom to decide questions of sovereignty solely on the basis of majority wishes of the population, but that there are also equally important geographical considerations which must be taken into account.” (p.48)

Turkey still supports this idea and she cannot tolerate an independent Republic of Cyprus in her southern borders. This attitude goes back to the year 1956 when “Vice-President Richard Nixon had been deeply impressed by what he called the Turks’ “positively pathological attitude on the Cyprus problem” during a visit to Ankara”. (p.87)

ONE OF THE EARLY US PLANS FOR CYPRUS

Julius C.Holmes, Special Assistant to Secretary Dulles proposed a ten-year autonomy for Cyprus, while the Governor would remain in his position, though having but a few veto-powers. A plebiscite would take place thereafter, guaranteed by NATO. If people voted for enosis they should receive it, but the British should be guaranteed broad military rights regardless of its outcome. NATO’s area would in the meantime be extended to include Cyprus.” (p.86)

THE IDEA OF THREE GUARANTOR POWERS

“Ever since an Indian UN resolution proposed calling for independence has been brought up in early January (1957), the Greek Government has started to lean towards this option. Parallel to the American pressure on Greece to accept a NATO move, the Greeks thus lobbied the Americas for the idea of independence for Cyprus. However, Foreign Minister Averoff made the fatal mistake of disclosing one idea behind independence in a debate in the Greek Parliament on 11 March, when he stated that it would be a transitional stage towards the realization of enosis. The British quickly noted this, while the Americans added concern about the basic idea of independence, because it would result in an economically weak country and would thus offer a fertile ground for communist influence. In order to disperse such fears Averoff has already on 13 February suggested during a meeting with Dulles a treaty of the type applicable to Austria since 1955 with the U.K., Turkey, “and any other NATO nations” guaranteeing that Cyprus would remain independent and not become a part of Greece.” (p.101)

FIRST US PROPOSAL FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

“As early as 16 April (1957, the acting Secretary) Herter (Deptel) wrote to the embassies and consulate of the region concerned that the “US now believes that either independence within (...) or (...) outside (the) Commonwealth coupled in either case with a treaty preventing enosis are worthy (of) serious consideration...The document as a whole was the first ever instance of US support for a specific solution to the Cyprus conflict.” (p.103)

FIRST NSC MEMORANDUM

Nicolet informs us that the first NSC (National Security Council) memorandum for “US policy toward settlement of the Cyprus dispute” was drafted in Washington on 18 July 1957. (p.104)

“The first bilateral discussions between the British and the Americans about the Cyprus problem took place between 10 and 18 September 1957...(The principal American participant, Walworth Barbour emphasized) that the US would not insist on any specific solution, but that the three parameters originally transmitted in a British oral communication of late July would be a useful point of departure. They were: “a) retention of essential military facilities under British sovereignty; b) protection of (the) island from Communist infiltration; and c) establishment (of) peace and tranquility in (the) island as a whole.” (p.108)

SECRET U.S. CONNECTION WITH THE UNDERGROUND ORGANISATIONS

I do not think that it was just a coincidence that the Turkish Cypriot leadership formed its underground organisation TMT during this period parallel to the EOKA of the Greek Cypriots. This organisation started the provocations against the Greek Cypriots and the progressive Turkish Cypriots which prepared the preconditions for an intercommunal feud. Here are some extracts to this effect:

“The CIA Deputy Director, General Charles P. Cabell, reported on the 353rd NSC meeting that Turkish Cypriots started to attack the British for the first time in an effort to force a partition of the island. (Date of the Editorial Note, 30.1.58) (p.115)

“Turkish-Cypriots, in Deputy Governor Sinclair’s words in “their all-out bid for partition,” staged a bomb explosion outside the Turkish Press Office in Nicosia, setting off violent rioting by the Turkish community.” Band s of Turkish Cypriots invaded the Greek Cypriot quarters of the city and attacked its inhabitants, promting Consul Belcher to fear a “virtual Palestinian situation,” meaning a British walkout from the island, letting the two communities fight its future among themselves. The bomb explosion and ensuing riots was to the Greek side a repetition of the tragedy of September 1955, when the Greeks had been attacked in Izmir and Istanbul. Soon enough Greece again blamed the US for not publicly deploring the Turkish Cypriot action America was drawn into the conflict against her will.”(p.119)

It seems that the author, Claud Nicolet does not have information about the main supporters of the Turkish Cypriot terror organisation TMT, as he makes this kind of assessment. (For a Turkish Cypriot evaluation of the role of the TMT in the Cyprus problem, see, Ahmet An’s “Kıbrıs nereye gidiyor? (Quo vadis Cyprus?), İstanbul 2002, p. 121-171)

Again Nicolet alleges that the author Christopher Hitchens shows no documentary evidence to sudden Turkish reversal of its stance after a substantial American loan was given to Ankara in the wake of the Middle East crisis at the time. (p.123) Whereas he writes a few pages later the following: “To this Dulles has no objection, mentioning that the Turks could hardly reject the idea after having received such a generous US aid package in the summer.” (p.128)

Nicolet’s approach to the valuable book “The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion” (1999) is similar when he writes:  “However, the contention by the two British journalists O’Malley and Craig in their sensationalist -and this not surprisingly popular- book, that “Eisenhover forced Harold Macmillan to give up sovereignty but denied the Cypriots real independence” is an inconceivable distortion of facts.” (p.140)

In another assessment, Nicolet says: “Kadritzke’s claim that AKEL had been proscribed because it was the only party that had organized members of both ethnic communities and thus worked against the British-intended ethnic-religious partition seems much too extreme, as it implies British drive towards partition as a set goal and in bad faith, rather than as a consequence of political turmoil and as their perception as the least of various evils.” (Deep-note, p.143)

This is a mere white-washing of the British-American partitionist policies which hides the provocations for the ethnic conflict and anti-communist hysteria of these two countries during the hey-days of the Cold War era. (See Ahmet An’s two article in the same book about the TMT terror on the progressive Turkish Cypriot trade union members who was against the partition policy of the British colonialists and their collaborator Turkish Cypriot leadership.)

As Nicolet mentions the Greek Cypriot contingency plan-Akritas- in his book (p.179), he avoids to mention anything about the Turkish Cypriot contingency plans which was published in full text with the copy of the Turkish original in Glafkos Clerides’s Memoirs “Cyprus: My deposition” (Vol. I, p.203 - 207 and p.466 - 472).

THE PRIORITIES OF THE AUTHOR AND THE US

Although Claud Nicolet supplies us very valuable declassified US and British material on the secret sides of the Cyprus problem, his main aim is written by himself in the following paragraph:

“It was emphasized earlier in this study that the American policy toward Cyprus from spring 1964 onwards never favored the partition of the island. Popular statements to the contrary by many authors of Greek and Greek Cypriot descent, in addition to some British sources, can be disputed with dozens of written documents from the US Department of State. The truth probably lies more in the direction of the following explanation. What was best for American interests, including their communication facilities, was an island that was peaceful and was removed as a bone of contention. Therefore, the US needed to find any solution that would pacify Cyprus. However, the exact outline of this solution and  what exactly it would entail was secondary, and priorities changed over time.” (p.283)

THE CIA OFFICIALS

The author should not forget that the day-to-day politics is done by the Foreign Ministries of the US, Britain, Turkey, Greece, but the secret deep state organisations like the Gladio do not open their archives in order to supply evidence of their subversive policies. Otherwise Nicolet will be writing this:

“Conspiracy theories by those authors who saw the CIA behind almost everything evil that was happening on the island have only been supported by the weak evidence that extremist  circles in Greece had some good relationship with CIA officials. The author Mayes is more careful. He mentions that many Greek and Greek Cypriots believe that the CIA was involved, but there is no proof for this.” (p.397)

Further in his book, Nicolet writes:

“If some CIA officials had actually encouraged the junta to overthrow the archbishop, they must have done so on a personal basis or owing to CIA sympathies with the junta, rather than an official US instructions. (p.450)

What the Cypriots have been suffering in the last 28 years can be found within the lines of Nicolet’s book. We have to congratulate him for bringing these documents into light out of the archives.  But even if he writes that most of the American documents of the 1970’s were not available at the time of his writing of the book” (p.399), he can accuse some authors that they made unrealistic assessments:

“It is therefore probable that Foley, Scobie, Coufoudakis and Polyviou -together with many other authors of Greek or Greek Cypriot origin- in their assessments chose to agree with Makarios that any proposal that deviated from a central Cypriot administration had to be regarded as “partition”. However, such an interpretation merely seemed to be useful for propaganda and justification purposes rather than being a realistic assessment.” (p.401) 

Although Nicolet criticizes the author Van Coufoudakis as a prominent representative of the theory that the US has endorsed partition since 1956 (p.445), he, himself, makes the following assessment:

“By the time Kissinger again came up with a compromise proposal of giving the Turkish Cypriots 30 percent of the island for autonomous rule in different areas, the Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes had already set an ultimatum, with conditions unacceptable to the Greek side.

After two further days of fighting, the Turkish military occupied the approximately 37 percent of Cyprus that it still holds today, according to a plan that had existed since at least 1964, possibly even since the 1950’s.” (p.452)

“Finally, the war of 1974 ended with US tolerance of de facto partition from the mid-1970’s onward, simply because it seemed to guarantee better stability in the region than the earlier situations. Though partition had turned up time and again in proposals throughout the previous twenty years, it had at no time been endorsed as the favourite US solution.

At no time during those twenty years had the Cypriots themselves been at the center of attention in the American formulations of a solution to their dispute. This was obvious when not even the US representatives in Cyprus were consulted regarding more extreme and pragmatic American plans for peace on the island, which triggered whenever the Cyprus conflict escalated.” (p.458)

What is still on the agenda of the US is the plans of the legal adviser Donald A.Wehmeyer, who in his Working paper, dated 11.12.1963 proposed a “Treaty of Joint Sovereignty of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey.” (p.226)

The same US official prepared an “Outline of Possible Cyprus Settlement” which is very interesting in relation to today’s solution proposals:

“On 24 April (1964) Legal Adviser Wehmeyer added an important ingredient for a solution, which would be more attractive to Turkey. Cyprus, Wehmeyer thought, should be divided into provinces. In addition to the plan above, an illusion of partition or federation could be created by designating certain provinces that were predominantly Turkish, as areas where the Turkish Cypriots would have special rights. This would be achieved by designating a Turkish eparch ad perpetuum to these provinces.” (p.229)

Acheson, however, was fully indulging himself in studying the different proposals that had emerged in Washington throughout the spring (of 1964). In Brands’ words, he was ready to devise a plan “that would eliminate the Cyprus problem by eliminating Cyprus.” A suggestion he was particularly intrigued with was Don Wehmeyer’s scheme of 24 April, providing enosis with an illusion of partition or federation to the Turks by the establishment of certain provinces to be administered by the Turkish Cypriot eparchs, as he cabled to Ball on 8 July (p.257).This was reached later through the US policy of   “controlled intervention” (p.213)

The famous American journalist, Cyrus L.Sulzberger wrote an interesting article in his column in the New York Times of 12 August 1961 and pointed to the “danger that the communists might come to power in Cyprus by an honest, democratic election.” (p.166)

Right after we see the approval of a National Security Action Memorandum 98 (25.9.1961) which stated that the  “US should assume a more active role in Cyprus than in the past and desires that the program to this end be pushed vigorously including overt and, where feasible, covert measures to contain and reduce communist strength.” (p.166 - 167)

Who knows what kind of action programs were used after the de facto partition of Cyprus in 1974 to keep the division of the two communities of the island. We can only read between the lines of certain books like “1989 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs” which writes under the “Cyprus” section the following:

“If the north and south of Cyprus were reunited in a future “federated Cyprus” the combined electoral strength of the Greek and Turkish communists could produce a majority of the votes in any presidential election under such a novel government.” (p.530)

(Turkish translation of this article was published in the weekly newspaper Yeni Çağ, on 21, 28 March and 4 April 2003 in Nicosia.)

 

REVIEW OF TWO BOOKS BY KIZILYUREK

 1.      Kızılyürek, Niyazi, Paşalar, Papazlar (Pashas and Priests), Nicosia 1988, 130 pages (in Turkish language)

The first thing to say about this book, written by Niyazi Kızılyürek, is that it does not have a unity of the subjects, dealt in the book. It is rather a compilation of 14 articles on different subjects. Although the title of the book is “Pashas and the Priests”, there is no account of their activities in the book. It seems that the title is selected for the sake of commercial attraction. The book is introduced as the first of a serial, called “Cyprus Notebooks”, as if others will follow. Unfortunately the wish of the writer to bring a new viewpoint to the history of Cyprus is not being realized in the 14 articles, published for the first time in this book. There is no chronological order of the articles, no systematic either. The introduction of the subjects is superficial and they have no connection between them. There are a lot of mistakes about the references of the books and the articles, on which the allegations of the writer are made. Moreover, the bibliography given after the 4th article is very poor for a researcher, who made his graduate and post-graduate studies in Germany. There is no mention of the place and the years of the publications of the reference material. There are also deficiencies in the footnotes within the text. There was also no need to imitate the writing style of the Turkish researcher, Yalçın Küçük. Although it is stated in the inner pages that the typesetting of the book was made in London, there is no mention of where the book was printed (in fact in Nicosia as I heard).

Özker Özgür, the Chairman of the Republican Turkish Party, wrote an article in Yeni Düzen newspaper about this book and said: “The loyalty to the Marxist method of criticism and interrogation is observed in the book. But this did not cause any dryness or boredom.” Thus, we learn from Mr. Özgür that the Marxist method can be dry and boring! Was Mr. Özgür not the one, who found out his reading of Marx’s “Capital” boring and turned to read Bülent Ecevit’s “This order has to be changed”, when he wrote years ago in his column in Halkın Sesi?

Why does Kızılyürek find it necessary to write the following sentence in the preface of the book: “The method of criticism and interrogation of this book serial is Marxist”? We could not find out the answer in the book. After we read the whole 14 articles, it becomes clear, how superficial the researcher understood the Marxist method.

Although in the preface it is written that there are 14 articles in the book, they are not numbered, but put in disorder. The first article is a speech made by Kızılyürek at a panel, organized in London on the “Cypriot Turkish Identity in the Literature”. The writer uses the term of “Cyprus upper-class”, which is not used in Turkish and it is indefinite. It seems that he preferred to use this term, translated from English, after looking at the underdeveloped character of the Turkish Cypriot commercial bourgeosie, instead of defining it with the classical term “bourgeosie”. But it is not appropriate, because it is well-known that the Turkish Cypriot notables have turned from tradesmanship and land-ownership into commercial bourgeosie. Its dependent and underdeveloped structure should not stop the writer to call them with this correct name. Kızılyürek writes the following: “Undoubtedly, there is a collaborationist-traditional section in every colony. But on the opposite side, there are local, national classes, which are pioneers of the national liberation movement, in other words, pioneers of becoming a nation and of modernization. This is failing in the Turkish Cypriot community.”

The writer alleges that he uses the Marxist methodology, but it is a pity that he prefers to take the easy way by saying “No, there isn’t”, when he looks and he does not see what he is looking for. Moreover, this proves that he did not make the necessary research of the socio-economic and political structure of the Turkish Cypriot community, which has a population of 100,000. As he could not use the Marxist thought in a creative way, he writes in short. “The political ideology and the ideological identity of the Turkish Cypriot upper-class formed itself as Sir plus Pasha plus Turan (Panturkism)” (p.20). He refers to the Sirs, OK. But where are the Pashas? He did not see it necessary to refer to the Ottoman society structure, which lasted 300 years and what did it leave as a legacy to the Turkish Cypriot community. He did not deal even with the rebellions of the people against the Pashas and the Priests during the Ottoman period. He writes that the identity of “Sir plus Pasha” got ripe in the 1940’s, without giving convincing and detailed information. Whereas in those years, there were differentiations, which started between the “upper-class” and the “lower-class” of the Turkish Cypriots in the standard of organization and difference of ideological views and the identity of today’s Turkish Cypriot leadership was about to be formed. The internal and external factors towards

becoming a national Turkish community out of a Muslim community started to be influential just at the end of 1940’s.

It seems that Kızılyürek either has insufficient information about the historical formation of the Turkish Cypriot bourgeosie, let alone about the struggle of the Turkish Cypriot working classes or he could not get what he wanted out of English and German reference books he read! Otherwise he would not write the following evaluation: “The reason of this crisis of the Turkish Cypriot community originates from the fact that it does not have a history of his own.” (p.24) If we say it with the writer’s terminology, contrary to his allegation (p.24), both the upper- and the lower-classes of Cyprus have made their own histories. What is important is that, one has not to alienate himself from these histories and has to regard the internal and external factors and that one has to make a scientific historical research. Such a work is done already in the reference books the writer has given.

What are being told in the section titled “Greek Cypriot bourgeosie, which is class-impotent” shows on the contrary, how potent the Greek Cypriot bourgeosie has been. That is why the judgements like are overturned realities: “The Greek Cypriot bourgeois class refrained from making a bourgeois revolution in Cyprus by uniting the Cyprus working class and why it does not want to share the power with the working class.” (p.30-31) Because it was the working class organizations themselves, which caused the historical division of the working class of Cyprus by grasping the enosis ideology of the Greek Cypriot bourgeosie. The explanation of the hegemony of the real pashas of today originates from this historical mistake.

(For the Turkish original article, see Araştırma kitaplarımız bilimsellikten uzak, Kıbrıs Postası, 18-19-21 June 1988)

 

2.      Kızılyürek, Niyazi, Ulus Ötesi Kıbrıs (Cyprus Beyond Nation), Nicosia 1993, 78 pages (in Turkish language), 88 pages in Greek language (İ Kipros peran tu ethnus)

Niyazi Kızılyürek introduced his book “Beyond Nation” to the readers in both Turkish and Greek languages in the same volume with a preface, where he writes: “Since many years, let there be a piece of scientific movement finally. With the hope of having more books published in two languages.” But there have been several scientific publications already about the influences of the Greek and Turkish nationalism on Cyprus problem, written by Greek Cypriots (e.g. Zenon Stavrinides, Michael Attalides and others) and by Turkish Cypriots (Notes on the development of a Cypriot consciousness, a serial by Kemal Cankat, published in the weekly Demokrat newspaper in 1989). Maybe these studies could not reach to a lot of readers, but Mr. Kızılyürek, as a researcher, should have been aware of them.

The author, who seems to be under the influence of Murat Belge, a Turkish writer, and especially of his book “In which part of the world is Turkey?”, tries to adapt Belge’s view, which is “to isolate the existing states from nationalism”. But he makes important mistakes by bringing wrong comments on the history of Cyprus. For example, he writes: “There was never a political or ideological initiative for co-existence” (p.13). He overlooks the activities of the Communist Party of Cyprus between the years 1921 and 1931 and the political activities of the Turkish Cypriot intellectuals, who got together around the weekly newspaper “Cumhuriyet” of the years “1960-1962.

The author defines the founding of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 as a “revolution” and the events of the 1974 as a “counter-revolution”. These examples show us that he is not realist, but he has a schematic approach. He does not refer to the fact that the roots of “competitive nationalism” (in his own words) grasped the Cypriot soil just in this period, when the British colonial administration staged the “1931 rebellion”, in order to stop the common political and ideological activities of both communities. (For a detailed explanation, please look at my serial: “The formation of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, Yeni Çağ weekly, 8 March 1993 – 28 November 1994 – 85 instalments)

How can one create a “Cyprus Beyond Nation” without referring to the importance of the “common class consciousness” in the development of the “us” feeing, without referring to the influence of Greece and Turkey, each being a NATO country, of the influence of Anglo-American imperialism on the Cyprus problem and on the Cypriots themselves?

Kızılyürek writes: “Even in the meetings of the most advanced sections of both communities, one feels the existence of doubt clouds”, which shows from which point of approach he looks at the problem!

We can conclude by saying that Mr. Kızılyürek need to learn more about the science of research and a sense of scientific judgement, before he publishes books, which can cause a lot of unquietness for himself and for those, who wage a struggle for the friendship of the two communities in Cyprus.

(For the original Turkish article, see Yeni Düzen, 30 January 1994)